Law Professors’ Statement on the Federal Government’s Power To Act in Mississippi

Extension of remarks of Hon. William F. Ryan of New York in the House of Representatives, July 1, 1964

Mr. Ryan of New York: Mr. Speaker for some time I have urged that Federal Marshals be assigned to Mississippi this summer to protect the several hundred civil rights volunteers as well as the Negro population of that State. The tragic disappearance of three dedicated and courageous young civil rights workers has awakened the Nation to the dangerous situation in Mississippi. A distinguished group of law professors from Columbia, Harvard, New York University, the University of Pennsylvania, and Yale Law Schools have issued a statement outlining the legal basis upon which the Attorney General and the President are authorized to act. I urge all of my colleagues to read this statement:

It has been reported in the press that the Attorney General has stated that the Federal Government lacks power to take preventive police action in Mississippi to secure the safety of persons who have come into that State to aid its colored residents in the effective exercise of their rights as citizens of the United States. The undersigned students of public law are troubled by the misleading simplicity of this reported pronouncement, and believing that the Federal power to take protective action in the circumstances that now prevail in Mississippi is clear, are moved to make this statement:

Use of Armed Forces

Under section 332 of title 10 of the United States Code the President is authorized to use the State militia and the Armed Forces of the United States “whenever he considers that unlawful obstructions, combinations or assemblages*** make it impracticable to enforce the laws of the United States *** by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings.” Should the President be persuaded that judicial processes are not able to secure the rights of Negro voters in Mississippi, or should he consider that those processes are not effectively safeguarding the rights of other Americans as they are defined in existing civil rights (e.g. sec. 1981 and 1983 of title 42) the quoted section would clearly authorize him to use armed forces to secure the rights referred to.

Of course the Attorney General knows this, for it was under section 332 that President Kennedy took military action at the University of Mississippi in 1962. Quite probably two considerations are factors in the Attorney General’s determination that section 332 has no immediate relevance. He and the President may be convinced that the time has not yet come to send military forces into Mississippi—that other processes should be exhausted before that most drastic of all remedies is pursued. If that judgment is a crucial element in the decision one wishes that it had been reported, for it would have made it clear that it is not lack
of Presidential Power to act but the absence of a conviction that action
is now called for that explains nonaction. Furthermore, the Attorney
General may, with some justification, feel that when military action is
taken under section 332 it is not fairly to be described as "police action"
—the type of action which he has denied the Federal Government is
empowered to take. These considerations, which may explain the Attorney
General's rejection of the current relevance of section 332, seem far less
applicable to the provisions of section 333 of title 10.

Use of Other Federal Agents

Under the terms of that section the scope of the Presidential power
to take protective and preventive action is not confined to the use of
the militia or Armed Forces. Though section 333 mentions specifically the
power to use those forces it also empowers him "by any other means (to)
take such action as he considers necessary to suppress, in a State, any
insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful combination, or conspiracy, if it
(1) so hinders the execution of the laws of that State, and of the United
States within the State, that any part or class of its people is deprived of
a right, privilege, immunity, or protection named in the Constitution and
secured by law, and the constituted authorities of that State are unable,
fail, or refuse to protect that right, privilege, or immunity, or to give
that protection; or (2) opposes or obstructs the execution of the laws of
the United States or impedes the course of justice under those laws."

Surely there is reason to believe that violence and combination are
now so hindering the execution of the laws of Mississippi and of the
United States as to deny to the Negroes of Mississippi rights secured
by the Constitution and laws of the United States. Whether the deplorable
circumstances are such as to make the provisions in subsection (1) of
the quoted section now operative is not important, for there can be no
question but that the provisions of subsection (2) fit the present circum-
stances precisely. Violence, combination, and conspiracy in Mississippi are
unquestionably obstructing the execution of the civil rights laws of the
United States—the provisions, that is, of sections 1981 and 1983 of title
42 and the provisions of the acts of 1957 and 1960 with respect to voting
rights.

Doubtless some creditable considerations of expedience could be cited
to support a decision against taking vigorous Presidential action under
section 333 in Mississippi. Surely however, the Attorney General's posi-
tion would be less misleading and therefore less perilous if he would
acknowledge that the President today has power to act but believes "police
action" under section 333 of title 10 is inadvisable.

In the year 1879 it was argued in the Supreme Court of the United
States that when Federal marshals sought to enforce the electoral laws
of the United States their conduct infringed the prerogatives of the
States—that the Nation, in other words, could not, through the authority
of its agents, take "police action" within the borders of any State. "It
is argued," said Mr. Justice Bradley, "that the preservation of peace
and good order in society is not within the powers confided to the Gov-
ernment of the United States, but belongs exclusively to the States. Here
again we are met with the theory that the Government of the United States does not rest upon the soil and territory of the country. We think that this theory is founded upon an entire misconception of the nature and powers of that Government. We hold it to be an incontrovertible principle, that the Government of the United States may, by means of physical force, exercised through its official agents, execute on every foot of American soil the powers and functions that belong to it. This necessarily involves the power to command obedience to its laws, and hence the power to keep the peace to that extent.” Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 394-395.

Unless the Attorney General disregards or somehow emasculates this pronouncement of the Supreme Court he cannot rest his case for executive inaction on the facile pronouncement that the Federal Government and the President of the United States are not empowered to take “police action” in Mississippi. It is at once disappointing and ironic that the Department of Justice, which has been bold beyond precedent in successfully urging the Supreme Court that the judiciary possesses the broadest powers to enforce the constitutional assurances of equality, should now discover nonexistent barriers to executive action.
