

## 1. History and current work

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The G.I. Project  
P.O. Box 80--Makati Commercial Center  
Santiago Village  
Makati, Rizal  
Philippines

Although the first projects to be established were those on the West Coast, it has now been decided that the Asian projects will have first call on central P.C.S. financial resources in the future. The second priority will be those West Coast projects which relate directly to the Navy and Airforce, i.e. the military branches most directly involved in the conduct of highly technological and automated warfare. The recent escalation of the air war over the D.R.V. would seem to validate this set of priorities.

Funding for P.C.S. comes from a variety of sources: individuals, small foundations and liberal grouping like certain church organizations and anti-war groups. The San Francisco office of P.C.S. provided approximately \$ 60,000.00 to the thirteen projects in 1971 with additional funds raised locally by each collective. Money is now increasingly hard to raise as the general political line of P.C.S. becomes more clearly revolutionary. Because of this, the future of some of the projects is now somewhat in jeopardy.



## Projects

### San Diego--3178 National Avenue

Work focuses primarily around Naval and Marine installations in the San Diego area where approximately 150,000 military personnel are stationed. Strong coalitions with other groups involved in radical research and organizing.

### Monterey

Most of this project's work is with trainees at Ft. Ord, the primary Basic Training and AIT Center for the Sixth Army Command. Troop strength now down from 45,000 to 25,000. A large percentage of Ft. Ord trainees in the past have been sent to S.E. Asia.

### Oakland

Essentially a counseling project for transient (AWOL's and deserters) and Vietnam bound G.I.'s. Most of the counseling and legal work is with Naval personnel in the Bay Area.

### San Francisco

Central P.C.S. support office as defined above. Also involvement in local organizing work like anti-CBRN efforts at the Presidio in S.F. and with the SOS (Coral Sea, etc.) Stop Our Ship project with aircraft carrier personnel at Alameda Naval Air Station.

### Tacoma, Washington

Primary work at Ft. Lewis (the second training base for the Sixth Army--soon to be phased out and training functions transferred to Ft. Ord) and McChord Airforce Base (which with Travis Airforce Base airlifts men and material to Asian military bases).

Several of these projects support monthly G.I. underground papers: Up From The Bottom (San Diego), the P.O.W. (Monterey) and the Fort Lewis-McChord AFB Free Press.

### Tokyo, Japan

The central PCS office in Asia providing basic coordination of the various projects, publication and communication services, liaison with the Japanese "left," etc. Much counseling and area organizing.

### Yokota AFB, Japan

A new project emphasizing local organizing with airmen at this largest of American airbases in Japan.

### Yokosuka, Japan

Another new project working with Naval personnel. This base slated to become a "home port" for one or two American aircraft carriers which indicates a major shift in American policy and a political issue of importance in the Japanese government. Major support base for ships of the Seventh Fleet.



Misawa, Japan

Airforce base in northern Honshu now serving primarily communications and surveillance functions for Korea. Most American aircraft and personnel recently transferred to S. Korea. Japanese Self Defense Forces now taking over one half of the base operations.

Iwakuni, Japan

Marine Airbase here is the largest American military installation in Japan. Storage base for nuclear weapons (see attached materials), support base for American forces in Indochina, some surveillance functions re: Korea. The strongest and most politically conscious G.I. movement is found here. Because of revelations by Japanese Diet members about nuclear weapons here, the base is of great importance in internal Japanese politics. The Sato government has promised to resign if the allegations about nuclear weapons are proved.

Okinawa

One of the primary PCS projects in Asia. Organizing work with all branches of service. Focus of work to build coalitions between Okinawan workers and G.I.'s, (see appended statement). Important area politically because of reversion and people's anti-AMPO struggles.

Philippines

New center recently established in Angeles near Clark Airforce Base. Continuing work in Manila area. New project for naval personnel at Subic Bay. It is our opinion that work in the Philippines is of very high priority. Already certain operations of the U.S. military are being transferred from S. Vietnam to Clark and Subic. Subic will continue to be the primary munitions depot and servicing facility for the Seventh Fleet. Relationships with liberation struggles in the Philippines also continue.

Hong Kong

The G.I. project here is now being essentially phased out since the status of H.K. as an R & R Center for Vietnam based G.I.'s has been phased out effective Nov. 1 1971. A small project will continue for perhaps a few more months at the listed address.

## 2. Political assumptions of P.C.S.

P.C.S. staff in all projects affirm both an anti-war and an anti-imperialist line and understand the importance of working toward the destruction of the military arm of American imperialism.\* Perhaps the two most immediate aims of our work are to give support to those active duty military personnel who seek, either through individual or collective action, to interfere with the functioning of the U.S. military machine, and to assist in developing the political consciousness of G.I.'s.

Marxism-Leninism-MTT thought has influenced the practice and theoretical stance of most of the projects and staff members. It is probably accurate to state, however, that most people related to PCS as civilian



cadre have only recently if at all really emerged from a "left-liberal" political stance and thus to a large degree reflect the political and theoretical disarray which characterizes most of the American left. We tend, unfortunately, to have post-revolutionary dreams in a pre-revolutionary society. We do agree, however, on the importance of supporting the immediate anti-war struggle within the military for the sake of our brothers and sisters in Indochina, for G.I.'s and for ourselves. Most of us hope to be involved in a small way in working for the abolition of the American system which enslaves people and forces its own youth to act as its mercenaries. We try both to agitate against specific abuses and injustices perpetrated by the military on G.I.'s and also to propagandize against the system which causes these abuses.

The short range strategic guidelines which inform our work include:

1. To delegitimize and discredit the authority of the military in the eyes of G.I.'s and the American people. So long as the military institution of imperialism is held in respect, it will be impossible for people to recognize its true, oppressive character and function. Non-lifer enlisted personnel must be seen and acknowledged as friends or at least potential allies, but the officers and the system itself must be exposed as enemies.
2. To support and encourage individual and collective G.I. resistance to the brass and the military system. This includes the whole arena of non-cooperation and refusal to take part in the military function plus the stronger acts of resistance.
3. Political education. Helping G.I.'s relate what is happening on base and within the brass versus enlisted men's struggle to the wider class conflict in the US and the world. This does not mean pushing any particular hard political line but it does mean studying the theory and practice of other class struggles, the class basis for war and imperialism, and the class structure and conflict in American society. The assumption is that oppressed G.I.'s (primarily from working class and petit bourgeois backgrounds) will find that their essential interests are opposed to the interests of the American ruling class.
4. To help G.I.'s concretely relate the on-base struggle to the class conflicts in the community around the base. It seems essential to us that G.I. work be related and in contact with workers, strikers, welfare struggles, etc. We agree that it is important to relate the struggles of oppressed G.I.'s to the struggles of other oppressed people, e.g. farmworkers, the poor, racially exploited persons, etc.

We also clearly recognize, however, that we do a wholly inadequate job of implementing the above objectives.



Other documents to be included with the materials on the G.I. movement will describe the class background of men and women in the various military services and the implications this has for political work within the U.S. military.

One of the realities of our work is the fact that civilian cadre in the G.I. movement must essentially support the initiatives of G.I.'s themselves. Since G.I.'s must face the consequences of their political actions while civilians are relatively immune from direct repression, it is wholly inappropriate for civilian cadre to totally dictate strategies and political lines. G.I. papers, for example, must essentially be the work of G.I.'s themselves and reflect their concerns and gut feelings. But because of the fact that most G.I.'s are young, politically unsophisticated and with little if any organizational experience, it is often difficult to maintain continuity and direction in projects and organizing efforts. In these instances, the leadership of civilian political cadre can be critical. And the problem of striking a balance in leadership questions creates continuing problems of maintaining momentum within the movement. Because of the political and organizational inexperience of most G.I.'s and civilian cadre, much of our work can be criticized for empiricism, i.e. the ~~par~~ political error of working with brief bursts of energy on particular problems without clearly defining how these issues fit into longer range political tactics and strategies.

All of this points to a primary contradiction the G.I. movement and its civilian support groups must solve: i.e., bringing clearer political and organizational perspectives into the work without pre-empting the basic and essential initiative and leadership of active duty G.I.'s.

In spite of these problems--financial, organizational, and political, P.C.S. intends to maintain its current network of projects in Asia for as long as possible. We are always open to suggestions and criticism from our comrades involved in the struggles for national liberation.

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\* The following example illustrates the importance of relating G.I.'s to local liberation struggles and exemplifies ~~an~~ a politically constructive way of combating American militarism.

#### The Baseworkers Strike in Okinawa

During late December of 1969, following a declaration by the U.S. military command in Okinawa that it intended to fire 2400 baseworkers in Okinawa, Zengunro (the militant baseworkers union) passed a strike vote demanding that U.S. bases in Okinawa be removed but that so long as the bases remained they be allowed to keep their jobs since the U.S. military virtually controlled all employment in Okinawa.

A Zengunro support group produced a leaflet and a poster in