

1968

"AT SAN FRANCISCO STATE ALONE, THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MASTER PLAN WAS IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWED BY THE DECLINE IN BLACK ENROLLMENT FROM 12 PER CENT TO 3 PER CENT . . ."

business as usual

SAN FRANCISCO STATE

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In its third month, the strike at San Francisco State College, the longest student strike ever and the first faculty strike in the history of California higher education, gained support from a significant cross section of Bay Area labor leaders. In early February striking members of Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers Local 1-561 of Richmond, California, and black, chicano and oriental students at State exchanged pledges of support while students joined the picket lines at the strikebound Standard Oil refineries. For almost three months the struggle has escalated and gained in effectiveness involving more and more of the San Francisco community in a consideration of the political stance of the students and teachers. As many as 600 policemen have fought pitched battles with thousands of students, arresting 456 on a single day for participating in an "illegal" campus rally. Classroom attendance hovered around 50 per cent before the American Federation of Teachers local went out, and plunged down to about 20 per cent during the final month of the semester.

Launched at the end of October by the Black Students Union around a series of long-standing grievances involving a proposed Black Studies department, admissions policies, financial aid and personnel disputes, the strike gained the support of several hundred white students and then broadened to include five other organizations representing chicano, Filipino and oriental students. Together they formed the Third World Liberation Front (TWLF) and issued 15 demands which projected the needs of the various ethnic communities in the Bay Area. They took the position that the strike would not end until all the demands had been met.

The administration's initial response was both frantic and equivocal. President Robert Smith called for negotiations, called in the police, and closed down the campus whenever a large student-police clash occurred. With some members stalling for time and others concerned about the issues, the faculty called a campus-wide convocation to discuss the strike. The TWLF effectively utilized the convocation to broaden the campus's understanding of their grievances, and to expose the administration's procrastination.

When it became apparent that the vacillation of the administration was undercutting its authority, Governor Reagan and the state college trustees pressured Smith into resigning and appointed Sam I. Hayakawa, a self-styled "liberal democrat," to implement a hard line. Hayakawa immediately declared a "state of emergency" which banned all free speech and assembly and led to a pattern of daily confrontation and violence. The escalation of police attacks on rallies and picket lines brought leaders from the black and other minority communities onto the campus to declare their support for the strike. In addition, the AFT began to lay the groundwork for a strike of its own. With public support for the strike growing, Hayakawa reversed his keep-the-campus-open-by-any-means-necessary policy and closed a week early for Christmas. Despite efforts by a rash of outside mediators to settle the strike, the trustees refused to enter into any kind of formal negotiations and January 6 found students and faculty jointly manning picket lines at all the entrances to the campus.

A series of injunctions against the strike and threats of mass firings did not deter the strikers; in fact, the strike's impact spread throughout the state system when AFT locals on other campuses staged a one-day sympathy strike and the San Jose

local went out for a month. In a reversal of the traditional pattern where Berkeley set the political tempo for the state and the nation, the State strike contributed to militant action at San Fernando Valley College and the College of San Mateo, as well as dozens of other campuses, from Brandeis to the University of Wisconsin to Duke. What had started at SF State as an isolated student action has mushroomed into a statewide educational crisis and set off a whole new cycle of student protests across the country.

I. EDUCATION: A CLASS AND RACE PRIVILEGE

The SF State strike is a response to a crisis in California higher education which has been building for ten years. Prior to 1959 California was fond of advertising the fact that it had one of the most inclusive, tuition-free, publicly-supported higher education systems in the United States. Its state colleges were supposedly prepared to accommodate any student in the top 70 per cent of his graduating class; for the top 33 per cent, there was the University of California, which was rapidly achieving a national reputation as one of the leading "multiversities." In accordance with industry's increasing needs for skilled, college-trained personnel and California's exploding population, these educational facilities were expanding at an impressive rate.

But industry can't rely on the state to use the public's funds to train its labor force and provide adequate mass education with a regressive tax structure. And California's tax structure is highly regressive. Business and industry bear only 20 per cent of the state's general tax burden; personal income tax, the only truly progressive tax in the state, accounts for no more than 20 per cent of the total state tax, and even here, the taxable income of a person who makes \$500,000 a year tends to be no more than \$20,000. Taking into account the way the tax burden is shifted onto the consumer through sales taxes, the state's largest single source of tax revenue, and the way that landlords shift property taxes onto their tenants, it is, in the words of one expert, "not unreasonable to assume for public policy purposes that household units in California bear at least 80 per cent of the tax burden." In contrast, Standard Oil of California pays no state tax at all, and the biggest of the agribusiness firms pay no more than \$50,000 a year. Thus, despite the fact that it has potentially one of the richest tax bases in the nation, California spent well below the average amount per \$1000 of personal income spent on higher education in the twenty-five other western states.

As a direct result of such conditions, 1959 found the state higher education system in the throes of a financial crisis. In the period between 1960 and 1975, full-time enrollment was expected to triple, the increase being felt most acutely in junior and state colleges. Prior to 1959 the legislature had projected plans for adding one new state college or university campus on the average every year between 1958 and the present while existing institutions continued to expand.

But the legislators knew full well that, barring a drastic revision of the state tax structure or a drastic redistribution of the state's wealth, it would be impossible for California to continue to underwrite mass public higher education. To come to grips with the problem, they authorized the University of California Board of Regents and the State Board of Education to draw up a Master Plan for Higher Education. The committee which drew up the plan was dominated by former University of California President Clark Kerr, the leading advocate of tying the university in a service capacity to industry.

The authors of the Master Plan faced a perplexing dilemma. Private industry demanded that public education subsidize its growing vocational training costs, but pauperization of the state due to a regressive tax system demanded that public higher education be trimmed down to size, or at least made more "efficient" and more carefully in tune with the job market. Not enough students were being geared for the increasingly skilled jobs that corporations needed filled. Somehow, within the framework of public subsidy, the functions of the various institutions had to be made more specialized; some way had to be found to exert greater control over the number of students who were channeled toward the different levels of the employment pyramid.

Thus, the authors of the Master Plan were charged by the legislature with eliminating "duplication of efforts" on the part of the state colleges and the university, between whom there was an increasingly bitter competition for state and federal funds. At the same time, the Master Plan was expected to somehow maintain the facade of state-supported education available to all; thus, it simply would not do to deal with exploding enrollments by placing an absolute ceiling on the number of students the state was willing to educate. Hopes that the private colleges might relieve some of the burden were of no avail since the private colleges, too, were having their financial difficulties.

Out of this set of contradictions, the Master Plan evolved a unique and unsettling solution. As a way of quantitatively limiting the maximum enrollments of the various institutions on the basis of what the state was able to afford, it altered the institutions qualitatively by jacking up their academic admission standards, reducing the number of college-eligible students, and channeling the rest into two-year junior colleges financed chiefly by local rather than state taxes.

For the four-year schools, admission to the University of California was now restricted to the top 12½ per cent of the high school graduating class, while admission to the state colleges was permitted for the top 33 per cent. The junior colleges were theoretically open to everybody; hence, the boast that the higher education system as a whole was being made more inclusive than ever. The claim is true in the most limited sense only. For even as the system was made more "inclusive," an elaborate and incredibly rigid class structure was built into it.

To determine which of the "segments"--junior college, state college, or university--a particular person will attend, the Master Plan makes liberal use of the "tracking system," which quickly became a fixture in California public schools. Students are tracked as early as the second grade, in order to separate the college material from the "less academically-inclined." While the former are groomed for their vocational niche in California industry, the latter's education is an exercise in social control at its crudest, with only half-hearted attempts at remedial course work and, later, vocational training.

Tracking is done on the basis of standardized tests--the IQ tests and College Boards--which are generally acknowledged to reflect a conventional white middle class bias. They penalize the black or third world student, the poor student, and often the creative student. The reason for this is fairly obvious: implicit in the notion that all students can be evaluated according to a uniform national standard is a total disregard for social, ethnic, or cultural differences. White students and minority students, or middle class and working class students, are evaluated

competitively regardless of their different social and cultural backgrounds. In addition it is a rule of thumb that the student from the white suburbs is prepared for college and gets more spent on his education, hence more preferential treatment, than the inner city black, chicano, or white. One need only compare the modern plush facilities of a Palo Alto or a Scarsdale with the run-down barracks of the inner city high school.

Such conditions are part of a nation-wide malaise. But it is particularly striking to see how they affected California public colleges. It might have been expected that the effective exclusion of minorities would continue at the University of California, which had always tended to be a lily-white school. But the drop in minority enrollment in the state colleges was more dramatic. At San Francisco State alone, the implementation of the Master Plan was immediately followed by the decline in black enrollment from 12 per cent to 3 per cent--this in a city whose public schools were rapidly approaching 70 per cent nonwhite.

Income distribution throughout the three levels of the public higher education system indicates that there is a class as well as race bias built into the Master Plan. Nearly two thirds of the students in the junior colleges have parents whose yearly income is less than \$10,000. For the state colleges, the figure is precisely one half. And for the University of California, two thirds of the students come from family income brackets of over \$10,000 a year, and for a majority, the figure is closer to \$12,000. But the income brackets under \$10,000 pay over half the state's taxes; at least half of these taxpayers are third world, among them 3½ million chicanos, 1½ million blacks, Chinese, Japanese, Filipinos, and American Indians. Yet the state spends twice as much money on the average university student as on the average state college student, and three times as much on the average state college student as on the average junior college student. In effect the system of preferential treatment according to class and race is carried on and perpetuated in higher education by taxing the lower class and the minority groups in order to pay for educational opportunities that these two groups cannot attain.

One of the supreme inconsistencies of the Master Plan is that, theoretically, the three "segments" were created not simply on the basis of entrance requirements or academic standards; rather, they were to comply with the state legislature's directive that there be no "duplication of efforts." Each segment was given a different "function" and expected to "strive for excellence in its own sphere." To the university fell the responsibility for graduate instruction and research; conveniently this also gave it a monopoly on federal grants. The state colleges were supposed to be the major institutions of undergraduate education. And the junior colleges were designed to siphon off students from the four year colleges and thereby reduce the operating costs of the system as a whole. In addition the junior colleges were supposed to salvage "late bloomers" and redirect them, academically "rehabilitated," into the four year schools. But this differentiation of functions does not show up in the budgeting of the respective institutions and one can only conclude that the conception of "excellence in your own sphere" is an impossibility if not a conscious fraud.

Undergraduate education is supposedly the province of the state colleges; more is spent both in teaching salaries and in total instructional expenditures on undergraduate education at the university. And though the junior colleges are supposed to

specialize in lower division education, the state colleges get more money both in teaching salaries and total instructional expenditure for their own lower divisions. University libraries are far better funded and supplied: the university receives far more in capital outlays. But the worst discrepancies show up in the area of faculty workload, salaries and fringe benefits. Average salaries at the university exceed those at the state colleges by over \$1000; for full professors, the gap is nearly \$3000. The state college faculty has one of the heaviest workloads in the nation. They have less time for sabbatical leaves, less opportunities to do research, less paid assistants. Claims of "excellence in their sphere" notwithstanding, the state colleges have clearly been relegated to the status of second-class institutions.

In the junior colleges the situation is even more transparent. For most students the junior colleges are essentially an extension of high school, with all the characteristics the analogy implies. Approximately ten per cent of the junior college enrollment graduates, goes on to four-year colleges, and completes an undergraduate education. The rest either drops out or else is waylaid by the institutions' mammoth counseling and testing operations, which in effect carry over the tracking system to the collegiate level. As with the high schools, the junior colleges tend to cultivate an elite of "successful" students while their fellow-students fall by the wayside. It is, of course, specious to say that these "late bloomers" are being magnanimously given a "second chance" by the Master Plan since it was the Master Plan which originally deprived them of their first.

Ultimate responsibility for educational policy was placed in the hands of the Coordinating Council for Higher Education. The function of the CCHE, according to the Master Plan, is to review budget and capital outlay requests for the public colleges, interpret their "functional differentiation," and generally develop plans for the "orderly growth of higher education in California." Its membership comprises three representatives apiece from the respective administrations of the junior colleges, the state colleges, the private colleges, and the university, and six representatives from the "general public." For "general public" read corporate elite; as with the UC regents and the state college trustees, these gubernatorially-appointed "common men" are invariably scions of agribusiness, the big utilities, banking and real estate, oil, and corporate law.

The neo-class structure of the Master Plan having failed to resolve the fiscal difficulties of California public education, there are now indications that the CCHE is preparing to abandon the facade of public higher education altogether by developing educational facilities which are tied more closely to industry. A recent report, Engineering Education in California, prepared for the CCHE suggests that the survival of higher education may well depend on its ability to bind itself, totally and inextricably, to the biggest and most dynamic of the new "growth industries," eliminate all functions which do not pertain directly to the needs of those industries, and abandon any pretense of attempting to meet the educational needs of either the individual student or the community.

The authors of the report undoubtedly have Stanford University in mind when they suggest this new conception of the university. (See Leviathan, March, 1969, for a full description of Stanford's activities.) Stanford grew from an "under-privileged" institution into the second largest research and development complex

in the United States by nurturing, and being nurtured by, the booming defense industries in the Palo Alto area. Accessible as it is to the military-industrial complex, however, Stanford is one of the costliest (in terms of tuition), most exclusive schools in the United States.

Where the University of California was one of the first of the big "multi-versities," and therefore came to be accepted as a kind of model for the new concept of "jet age education," Stanford suggests new possibilities at a more advanced stage. UC Berkeley built itself up on federal grants, which accounted for roughly half its total budget, and relatively minor alliances with agribusiness. But agribusiness is quickly being supplanted by defense as California's leading industry, and where UC's defense contracts were made with the federal government, Stanford hires itself out directly to Litton, Lockheed, and Hewlett-Packard, whose purse strings are far less tight. Its status as a private institution makes possible the kind of collusion with private industry which would be illegal for a public university. Moreover, unencumbered by state or federal bureaucracy and blessed with a high tuition rate and an exclusive academic character, Stanford is both more efficient and more capable of intense specialization than public institutions, which retain certain obligations to the taxpayer. Yet it is still eligible for public subsidies and public support and the increasing orientation of the CCHE is to provide it with precisely that kind of support, at the expense of the state colleges.

There is good reason to believe that this may be the wave of the future in California education: shift the burden from the public to the private sector; abandon the educational welfare state; maximize the output of intellectual resources upon which the "growth industries" depend by trimming away frills and cultivating an educational elite. What is most important to note is that all of this can be done through public financing. The allocation of public funds has already been placed beyond public control in the hands of the CCHE which is made up entirely of nonelected officials. At this point there is nothing to prevent the CCHE from restricting the growth of public education by building up private institutions with public funds.

Governor Reagan put it all very neatly in a recent state of the state message: "Publicly-supported higher education is not a right; it is a privilege." That sentence may well be the final epitaph of mass public higher education in California, the Master Plan having been the first. It certainly precludes any kind of educational system which is responsible to the community or responsive to community needs.

II. "THE QUIET REVOLUTION"

Striking students at SF State are only now becoming aware of how the situation that they are fighting grew out of the Master Plan and the operations of the CCHE. As early as 1962, however, when the Master Plan was beginning to shape education in California along clear class lines, some SF State students were developing their own concept of the college's relationship to the surrounding community. With the traditional rah-rah student activities on campus in a state of decline, these students became interested in the idea of making the campus a base for community organizing and civil rights agitation.

Their first target was the student government. By winning every student election but one from 1962 on through continuous involvement in student politics, a hard core of student activists gained nominal control over \$300,000 in compulsory student body fees. This secured a financial base from which a series of educational reform and community action programs were launched.

Dominated by white students in their early stages, these programs developed along two lines. The first was geared towards off-campus organizing and was embodied initially in a tutorial program which was designed to help ghetto children and other rejects of the public school system on an each-one-teach-one basis. Next a Community Involvement Program (CIP) was set up with funds that were originally allocated by the student legislature to send students to Mississippi in the summer of 1964. The chancellor of the state colleges, in the first of a long series of disputes over the rights of students to handle their own funds, tied the money up long enough to prevent students from using it in Mississippi. But when CIP was created next year it immediately engaged in such activities in the local community as tenants union organizing, welfare rights agitation, the Delano strike, and some tentative forays into white middle class neighborhoods.

The second trend in the student programs was represented by the creation of the Experimental College in the spring of 1966. The students associated with it were convinced that, education being the primary instrument of social indoctrination, educational reform would lead necessarily to social reform. They set up their own courses, hired their own professors, among them Paul Goodman and LeRoi Jones, and even succeeded in getting the college to make special arrangements so that the courses could be accredited.

The EC was the only white student program to directly involve large numbers of students. Anyone could teach a course, any subject was acceptable, and liberal credit arrangements would be provided through the special studies loophole. But while the EC was able to launch a few satellite programs of its own, including Draft Help and MAX, a professor evaluation booklet based on student surveys, the open-to-everybody principle attracted a flood of visionaries from San Francisco's then-flourishing hip community, who wanted a nonpolitical, unstructured environment in which to do their thing. Given these tendencies, the EC was never able to develop a coherent approach to educational reform.

The rise of the white student programs was accompanied by the emergence of black students as a potent political force. Prior to 1965 the black students were mainly organized into the Negro Students Association (NSA). Primarily a social club, the NSA had some black nationalist leanings, but seldom if ever involved itself in campus politics. Times were changing, however; the civil rights movement had given way to Black Power, and the Watts rebellion tore away the facade of peaceful progress.

At SF State a new core of black activists was beginning to develop their own political perspective for black students. They accepted the model of the student programs and the student government as a potential financial base. Influenced by the shift from civil rights to black power, black students moved into the EC and inaugurated a black arts and culture series. In the Tutorial Program their influx brought about a significant change in policy whereby children in the program--mostly black--were now to be tutored by students who shared their ethnic background and cultural experience.

By the summer of 1966, the NSA had become the Black Students Union. With a new political direction the BSU pushed for a complete black studies curriculum, not in the EC, but incorporated into the programs of existing academic departments. The ultimate goal, however, was an officially recognized, academically "legitimate" Black Studies Department, funded by the college and created and controlled by black people.

This strategy was soon to lead to direct confrontation with the college administration and, by implication, the Master Plan. It was one thing to set up an Experimental College with student body funds; it was quite another to demand that the college set up new college programs and departments with its own resources. The Master Plan was not set up to deal with this kind of challenge because in the first place the implementation of the Master Plan was responsible for the drastic reduction in black enrollment at SF State. By demanding a Black Studies Program the SF State students were asking the CCHE to ignore the fiscal crisis that was responsible for the Master Plan and reverse the educational priorities which it had developed over ten years. The BSU's demands represented a fundamental attack on the class and race nature of California higher education as we have described it.

By the fall of 1967 a new mood of student militancy was sweeping the campus, its main sources being the BSU and the Students for a Democratic Society. The fall of 1967 was the high water mark of the anti-war movement. Thousands stormed the Pentagon and students, including a large contingent from SF State, fought the police and built barricades in the streets of Oakland during Stop the Draft Week. On campus SDS pulled off a successful cafeteria boycott around the issues of lower prices and student control. With less success it attempted to mobilize students around the war-related issues of class rankings and military recruiting.

While SDS made several tentative forays attempting to build a constituency, the BSU added a special admissions program which would waive academic entrance requirements for a certain number of incoming blacks to their demand for an autonomous Black Studies Department. The importance of special admissions was becoming critical since admissions procedures based on standardized tests clearly discriminated against minority students from the inner city's inferior high schools. This sort of institutionalized racism, coupled with the growing anti-BSU line taken by the Journalism Department-controlled campus daily, led to a brawl in the paper's office between black students and white staff members. When eight black students were suspended, the BSU countered by calling a demonstration which succeeded in closing down the campus for a day and eventually getting the eight suspended students off the hook. From that point on racism became a central issue at SF State.

The situation escalated in the spring of 1968. SDS mounted a campaign to get the Air Force ROTC off campus. When the students passed a referendum calling for the removal of AFROTC, the faculty turned down the demand. The administration promised the BSU a Black Studies Department, and Nathan Hare, a black sociologist from Howard University, was brought in to head it. A tentative special admissions program was also approved.

At the same time a new element entered the campus struggle. In February, 1968, the History Department dismissed Juan Martinez, a "troublesome" professor and the only chicano on the faculty. The writings of Fanon and the anticolonial ideology of the Black Panthers began to have their impact. The notion of third world solidarity brought a number of ethnic minorities together to demand his rehiring. The Third World Liberation Front was born, demanding--in addition to the retention of Martinez --that chicanos, orientals, and Filipinos be accorded the same kind of concessions the BSU had wrung from the administration; specifically, more third world faculty, and their share of the special admissions quota. The last week of May found them jointly occupying the administration building with SDS, which was still demanding AFROTC's ouster. Under pressure from the Mexican community, President John Summerskill granted the three TWLF demands and then departed abruptly for Ethiopia, throwing the campus into a state of chaos. The spring semester ended with the AFROTC issue still unresolved, and the participants in the sit-in had to settle for a partial victory.

It soon became clear that it was not even that, however, for in capitulating to the third world demands President Summerskill had made promises that the college was in no position to keep. By now bled virtually dry by the fiscal squeeze of the Master Plan, SF State was over \$750,000 in debt. Special admissions could not be adequately funded; the financial aids office was utterly incapable of dealing with the problems of special admittees; and the Black Studies Department existed on paper only. Frustrations mounted; finally the BSU, determined to clear things up once and for all, decided to marshal its own forces and compel the administration to declare its position. The strike was called; a few days later the TWLF joined it, and the battle began.

III. ON STRIKE

From the strike's inception the Third World Liberation Front took the position that the fifteen demands were non-negotiable, that the strike would not end until all fifteen were met. This position has baffled many outsiders, including some sympathetic observers who feel that the strike would gain more public support if the TWLF expressed a willingness to "sit down and talk." But the nature of the demands and the issues underlying them are such that they cannot be dealt with except as a unit.

Taken separately, the demands are virtually meaningless in terms of the TWLF's ultimate goals. Together they pose the most substantive and far-reaching kind of challenge not simply to the SF State administration, but to the whole direction education in California has taken since the imposition of the Master Plan. The connection here--and this cannot be overstressed--is not merely a symbolic one. We have seen how the Master Plan and the state's fiscal situation built racism into California higher education as a matter of economic and political necessity in the most direct and obvious sense. But posing an alternative to that institutionalized racism also necessitates that the students move beyond the symbolic, into the realm of the programmatic--something no previous campus uprising has really done.

The increasing militancy of the black liberation movement and the official efforts to direct it into "harmless" channels such as Nixon's proposed "black capitalism" have given the term "black studies" an air of legitimacy. But the concept of black studies has not yet been clearly defined. Several of America's elite colleges, including Yale and Harvard, have already formulated plans for undergraduate programs in "Afro-American studies." Such programs are, to quote SF State's Nathan Hare, "aimed at 'rehabilitating' individual students and potential students by means of pride in culture, racial contributions generally, and regenerated dignity and self-esteem."

The crucial phrase, of course, is "individual students." Harvard and Yale may be very enlightened in terms of the kinds of curricula they are willing to offer, but even with an extensive scholarship or special admissions program for minority students, they are not accessible to the masses of blacks. It would be ludicrous to suggest that they would in any way be prepared to meet the educational needs of the black community as a whole. They are capable, though, of cultivating what one foundation executive has called a "talented tenth." A select group of black students could, without straining the resources of the colleges or the economy as a whole, be singled out, given special attention and special opportunities, and bombarded with courses with which they could identify. But, as Hare points out, no matter how "relevant" an education the college sought to give these students, its efforts would be basically irrelevant to the black community since they would simply serve to isolate the students that much more from their own communities and thereby lessen the identification with their people which is supposedly the educational and ideological basis for the black studies curriculum.

For the black student, then, the program would be doomed to failure. But would it really fail for the college authorities or for the ruling elite? Robert Hoover, ousted head of the College Readiness Program at College of San Mateo (one of the few successful experiments in community-based minority education, now effectively killed by the local campus administration), has pointed out that of the ten per cent of America's black population which succeeds in getting through college, only two per cent return to the black community upon graduation. The rest are "integrated" into white society, contributing whatever skills they may have picked up in college to the economy of white America and lending a shred of legitimacy to the myth of "Negro progress." Meanwhile the black community, robbed of the trained manpower it so desperately needs to overcome its traditional position of dependency, continues to languish, now worse off than ever.

But the proposed cultivation of a "talented tenth," particularly at elite colleges with better financial resources, may produce a new kind of exploitation-through education. Conceivably, it could devote itself to turning out not so much the "professional token Negroes" of the immediate past as the new black bourgeoisie, the hip black administrators of the immediate future. The latest of the official responses to the threat of civil insurrection in the inner cities is an attempt to build up with federal or foundation backing a sophisticated native bourgeoisie in the black colony composed of carefully-trained leaders who are more capable of keeping the lid on than the discredited, distrusted, despised white administrators. (See Leviathan, March, 1969.)

But the TWLF's response to this trend can be seen in the most controversial of the fifteen demands, that which states that all third world students seeking to enroll at the college must be admitted. Without such a stipulation, the TWLF has steadfastly maintained, an ethnic studies curriculum is effectively useless, since it does not address itself to the needs of the entire community, but simply to those of a privileged few. And the underlying principle of the SF State strike is that it is for the nonwhite community, not the "racist administrators" to decide what kind of educational opportunities its children will receive; hence, the demand that the Ethnic Studies program be completely autonomous.

"We don't want equality," says TWLF leader Roger Alvarado, "we want self-determination"--a simple statement which suggests the complete failure of American education not simply for third world students, but for everybody. And needless to say, the educational philosophy behind the demands for autonomy is completely irreconcilable with the race-class bias of the Master Plan, corporate control of the university, and the whole notion that the first duty of higher education is to develop a skilled work force.

Nor should the significance of the distinction between black studies and ethnic studies, between a black students' strike and a third world strike, be overlooked. The whole notion of an alliance between a number of nonwhite groups, of third world solidarity, suggests an ideological orientation, drawn from Fanon, which is potentially revolutionary, enveloping as it does a condemnation of the whole system of American imperialism and the way that it has displaced and exploited other races and nations within its own borders. The third world alliance flies in the face of American pluralism, with its traditional adage that the squeaking wheel gets greased. What if all four wheels squeak at the same time?

In California chicanos outnumber blacks by more than two to one, and their educational needs are, if anything, more acute, but they have never been highly publicized. Similarly, San Francisco's Chinatown is a popular tourist trap whose public image--one of a "self-helping" community of successful businessmen, studious and obedient children, hierarchies made legitimate by quaintness and tradition, and a generally docile, contented, respectable populace--veils an abominable, overcrowded ghetto with one of the highest TB rates in the nation where people work fourteen hours a day in sweatshops for starvation wages and the average educational level is not even second grade (the citywide average is 12th grade).

Here too are victims of American racism; here too are people with demands to make on the ruling class. A college administration desirous of peace at any price could have tried to accommodate the black students by cannibalizing existing departments and programs to scare up money for Black Studies. But the demand for an entire school of ethnic studies, accessible to the entire nonwhite community, greatly magnifies the challenge to the Master Plan and increased elitism in California education.

Like the third world students, the faculty is also reacting to a deterioration of their position in California higher education. Their demands are also directed against the inequities growing out of the Master Plan. Besides one of the heaviest workloads in the nation and a significant wage differential between themselves and

university faculty, the faculty has no contract rights whatsoever. This situation was made painfully clear to them when an across-the-board pay cut for state college faculty, which happened to violate the terms under which most of them had been hired, was upheld by the courts on the grounds that none of these terms had been in writing. In addition the Master Plan has cut the state college faculty off from the prestige and the research grants available to university professors.

Because 60 per cent of the funds budgeted for four-year institutions are allocated to the university where less than 40 per cent of the four-year students are enrolled, the state college faculty is assured of being treated like second-stringers. Moreover, the structure of the state college system systematically excludes the faculty from any real voice in the decision-making processes which ultimately govern the conditions under which they are forced to work. These decisions are the exclusive realm of the legislature, the governor, and his political appointees on the CCHE and Board of Trustees. The AFT's response, however, has been far from radical. Their demands are centered mainly around bread-and-butter issues of salaries, workload, grievance procedure and fringe benefits. The underlying principles the teachers seek to establish are their right to bargain collectively with the trustees.

But if the faculty grievances are plain enough, the way they envision the resolution of the crisis is quite another matter. Certainly collective bargaining rights for the faculty will seriously upset the present power relationships within the state college system, but it is difficult to say whether it would lead to fundamental changes in the nature of the system itself. The AFT's present position with respect to the TWLF demands is that the grievances of minority students, growing out of the Master Plan or the absence of adequate financial resources to run the state colleges, are primarily the responsibility of a reactionary administration in Sacramento. To rectify this, some AFT leaders have, in conjunction with liberal Democratic politicians in the Bay Area, concocted a bizarre proposal for autonomy and "home rule" for SF State, the presumption being apparently that San Francisco, a labor town with a liberal Democratic (albeit viciously opportunistic) mayor, would make a more beneficent guardian for the SF State campus than those madmen in the state capital who stay in office on the votes of Southern California right-wingers.

The "home rule" proposal may be developing into a slick marriage of convenience; the AFT, taking on the whole state college system, is in need of allies, and the Democrats, with the 1970 elections just around the corner, are looking for issues with which to attack Reagan. But there is one key flaw in this little scheme, at least with respect to the fifteen demands: it was not Reagan who created the Master Plan, but the administration of liberal Democrat Pat Brown; moreover, for every reactionary trustee or CCHE member appointed by Reagan, there is at least one other who is just as reactionary and was appointed by Brown. As for the fiscal conditions which made the Master Plan an economic necessity, it is unlikely that either the Republicans or the Democrats can revamp the state tax structure based as it is on the needs of California industry.

But the AFT is also courting another ally, in the form of the San Francisco labor establishment. Getting strike sanctions from the Central Labor Council was no easy feat, since labor in general has been hostile toward campus rebellions, especially where they involve racial issues. But the labor establishment faces a crisis of its

own: union membership has not been growing and as automation becomes more prevalent it may actually begin to decline. The largely-unorganized public service employees may therefore represent the last best hope for the continued prestige of the labor movement. With the nation's educational system showing severe signs of internal strain, teachers may be one of the most promising areas of labor's new frontier. Accordingly, union leaders in San Francisco hesitantly lent their support to the AFT, stipulating at the same time that they wanted no part of the student side of the strike. The continued refusal of the state college trustees to negotiate has caused labor support for the AFT to grow markedly in the past month, particularly after the local courts ruled that the faculty walkout was illegal, public employees not having the right to strike.

But workers themselves only began to show some signs of sympathy for the striking students after Bay Area cops attacked the picket lines of striking hospital workers and striking oil workers. The students' hatred of the police then began to make some sense to union members; still, this is hardly a basis for a "worker-student alliance," particularly where neither the workers nor the students have found a programmatic way to relate to each other's struggles.

While third world students have been able to mobilize strong support from their own respective communities, white students have found it difficult to reach the white working class. The racial connotations of the student strike leave workers either apathetic or threatened while the social image and bohemian appearance of many white radicals tend to create a cultural barrier between the two groups.

That this barrier should be so serious a problem is an indication of both the considerable progress and a major failing of the white student movement. On the one hand, the sudden intense interest on the part of white radical students in "hooking up with the rank and file," devoid as it is of any consistent programmatic approach and organizational framework, suggests the ideological development of the movement growing out of the war, which involves both an increasing awareness of the dynamics of American imperialism and an increasingly sophisticated critique of American capitalism. But the "student-worker alliance" is also rapidly becoming a matter of necessity. The sense of moral commitment and desire to better the plight of others which marked the early days of the movement is rapidly becoming inadequate to sustain it. When the civil rights movement was redefined, white "missionaries" were no longer needed--as the white students in the SF State Tutorial Program were quick to discover. Now that the opposition to the war has been fragmented by the Paris negotiations, the anti-war movement appears to have reached an impasse. Campus revolts, particularly where they fail to involve issues as critical to the community as they are to the students, are becoming frozen into a predictable pattern which shrewd administrators are becoming more and more adept at containing, as the disastrous Moses Hall sit-in at UC Berkeley attests. Moreover, campus radicals--particularly at SF State, where the college presidency changed hands twice in a period of less than six months--are increasingly beginning to discover that what have been posed in the past as "campus issues" cannot be confined to the campus; their origins and solutions lie beyond the pale and power of the local administrative autocracy.

Indeed, the astonishing success of the SF State strike--and, conceivably, the freshness and originality of the tactics employed--can be directly attributed to the fact that it was led by third world students, with white students in a supportive role. Certain characteristics unique to SF State were factors in the quality of the third world leadership: it is, in name if not in fact, a community college in an urban environment, with four different ghetto areas nearby. Its activist students had at least three years of intensive community work behind them, and the fact that white and third world students had worked together in the past lessened the distrust and fear of manipulation. Most significantly the tutorial and community work of the third world students gave them both a genuine sense of an off-campus constituency, and a thorough understanding of that constituency's needs, which are clearly reflected in the fifteen demands. As a result, there was a total absence of the symbolic issues which have so often marked campus revolts led by white students (such as Columbia, where a whole history of the University's shady real estate operations in Harlem was recapitulated in the Morningside Heights gym).

The nonsymbolic nature of the SF State strike was likewise reflected in the tactics, which carefully avoided the usual ritual seizure of buildings and planned confrontation with police. Instead of "living the revolution": inside an occupied building for a brief, apocalyptic period culminating in a Big Bust, and then attempting to prolong things by playing upon the shock of police occupation (which, at many campuses, is becoming less and less of a shock), the TWLF opted for a "protracted struggle," closing the campus and keeping it closed by not simply impairing normal campus activity, but making it totally impossible.

The white students have played an important role in keeping the strike going. They supplied most of the manpower for the demonstrations, the picket lines, and the clashes with the cops; they turned out an abundance of literature, from the daily leaflets to substantive, in depth analyses in pamphlets, the student paper Open Process, and the highly successful Strike Daily wall poster. They got strike information out all over the state, put together fund-raising benefits for bail, set up an agit-prop, organized an AFT local for teaching assistants, and formed departmental caucuses around issues raised by the strike.

The last three activities should far outlive the strike; indeed the strike has, overall, provided white students with a new educational context. Classes and grades have given way to a readjustment of educational priorities along radical lines. Where the college was once viewed as a sanctuary for dropouts or a social escalator for students on the make, it is now often likened to a factory or a concentration camp. White students who have been striking for the last four months will find it difficult to resurrect their forgotten academic goals, and, having come to such a point, it is winning the struggle, rather than winning a degree, that counts.

The crucial question--how the white students will go beyond the strike--remains, but the strike itself may provide an answer. Recently white strikers, searching for allies, have begun taking a more serious interest in labor disputes, especially in the Bay Area, joining union picket lines where possible and attempting to explain the student strike to white workers. Until now, it has mainly been a one-way street, though the presence of students on their picket lines has given rise to a certain tentative interest in the student struggle on the part of union members. But the