Introduction: political crisis

Even the 1964 Presidential elections do not obscure the deeper political drama playing throughout the nation. John Kennedy's last year in office was the epitome of the oft-cited conflict between the forces of modern urban society, represented by the President, and those of small town early twentieth century America, represented by the Congress. Congress is deadlocked by traditional conservatism, unrepresentative membership, and organized ineffectiveness. Yet, there are forces arising against the deadlock. The outcome, sooner or later, will be a repair of the American political mechanisms. Who will do the repairing and for what purposes? The answer to these questions are all-important for the politics of the Sixties and Seventies.

1. The deadlock and its critics

The problems of Congress are becoming well known. It over-represents the rotten boroughs of agrarian America (although not as much as some think) and white southern America. It compounds this oligarchy by the seniority system through which representatives accumulate committee power and prestige merely by waiting long enough. Its concern with local political interests detracts from its ability to manage foreign policy considerations, something the founding fathers little intended it to do anyway.

The critics of Congress in the Forties and Fifties were the orthodox liberals in the labor movement, the universities, and elsewhere. Lately, however, it is interesting to see the liberals being joined by the sophisticated political and economic conservatives. Walter Lippman, for example, published a major indictment of Congress in Newsweek; Business Week early in 1963 devoted one of its "special reports" to raising questions about the extent to which Congress was "doing its job," and followed this up with shorter articles during and after the debacle of the second session of the 87th Congress. The complaints reached the point where some Congressional leaders felt it necessary to issue a defense of Congressional activity in that session.

Distinctions between liberals and conservatives often are asserted in varying forms. And, indeed, frequently on individual issues there is a serious difference where the liberal shows more worry about the need for humane treatment of the underprivileged. But it is more important in general to notice
the ways in which these differences are superficial and diminishing, and to realize the broad areas upon which liberalism and sophisticated conservatism today agree.

The question of Congressional reform is a good case in point. Probably the major theme of both liberal and conservative criticism is dissatisfaction with the way in which Congressional organization and folkways prevent or delay the enactment of what is felt to be necessary, or desirable, legislation. The targets usually are the powers exercised by committee chairmen and by the House Rules Committee, the Senate filibuster, and the general machinery of delay available in either house. While it is true that both houses are organized for inaction, this criticism by itself fails to take note that nearly all Congressmen appreciate the rust-on-their-setup. Bills fail not simply because of Congressional machinery and organization, but because of the lack of support by a majority determined enough to challenge customary Congressional practice. If a majority were strongly in favor of medicare, for example, it could utilize the device of a discharge petition to get the bill out of the House Ways and Means Committee, where it has been since its introduction more than five years ago. But as Alperowitz and Willenson assert, "What is really wrong with the liberals is not that they are foolish men, but that they are unwilling to undergo the rain of strict discipline or to undertake the difficult tasks of organization that effective leadership requires. It is much easier, much less painful, to ride along with the seniority system and the entrenched leadership than it is to defy the organization by setting up a solid voting bloc and demanding a price for cooperation." The majority of Congressmen agree to the rules of the game, stacked as they are, because their personal relationships with the oligarchs they fear to disturb and their need to "get along" (which requires deference to authority no matter how unrepresentative) are more important to them than the resolution of particular problems facing the country. Congress is not ruled by an undemocratic reactionary elite; the elite rules with the consent of the majority.

Perhaps what is most deeply missing from the standard liberal and conservative critique of Congress is a primary commitment to the goal of participatory democracy. Nearly all criticisms are well within the conservative tradition of political theory which views democracy as no more than the alternating competition of elites for the periodically registered consent of the voters. The idea of democratic participation, on the contrary, implies massive and continuous involvement of the people in whatever decisions affect them in all their working and living conditions. Though usually dismissed as utopian, the commitment to democratic participation contains a basic practicality, stemming from two judgements. The first judgement is that no political program such as the war on poverty can be tailored to fit human needs unless the people, in action, demonstrate the true dimensions of the need and have the determining voice in solving their problems.
The second judgement is that a public program, if enacted in a climate of political indifference, rather than participation, is likely to be corrupted, ill-used, or destroyed by the restraining hand of those who oppose the program, if not by the indifference or indeed the active hostility, of those who are the purported beneficiaries. The nation’s urban renewal and public housing programs provide adequate illustration of this corruption and destruction. The failure of New York, the most "liberal" city in America in terms of its official ideology, laws and urban program, to begin to meet its racial and economic problems should be testimony to the "unrealism" of the practical politicians, liberal or conservative. To take another example, the staff of the President's Appalachian Regional Commission drafted an entire plan for the future of the people of Appalachia although they took only two "grand tours" through the mountainous region themselves. Both tours consisted of meetings with state governors and elite officials designated by the governor. To be heard at all, the distressed miners of Hazard, Ky., had to demonstrate in Washington and initiate a meeting with the President's Commission. These examples, we believe, typify the approach of the government, corporations, and foundations in providing for the general welfare.

The liberal and conservative critics of Congress may have decided that democratic participation is not feasible. However, their failure to express even a nostalgic worry about participation gives one pause. Their fundamental concern, almost without exception, is with the adjustment of politics to the alleged needs of an urban industrial society. Though some would do it more charitably than others, their basic concern is to create a reign of what Senator Clark calls "modern representatives." (4)

2. The corporate ideology of the modernizers

"Modern" is a significant descriptive term. It suggests the end of traditional ideological conflicts. As President Kennedy said in his 1962 Yale commencement address: "Today...the central domestic problems of our time...do not relate to basic clashes of philosophy and ideology, but to ways and means of reaching common goals...the practical management of a modern economy...." The "modernization" of Congress would not be a shift to the "left" or the "right" so much as a shift "forward." But "forward" to what? To a ratification and expansion of the particular political economy now developing -- the political economy of the corporate state.

The corporate state is an industrial system arising as a rational alternative to the classical free market. Explained most simply, it is a system in which government and large corporations harmoniously interlock; in which the government, using public revenues, stabilizes the business cycle by underwriting business investment; in which corporation boards plan their profit and investment objectives and the government helps carry them out; in which labor unions are formally integrated into the system of enterprise, albeit usually in a lesser role. It keeps up a privately-owned and controlled production system with its ethical emphasis on "getting more for less."
It freezes and bureaucratizes social conflict wherever it breaks out in the industry, union, or community. It basically is a system of elite control over domestic and foreign policy. A liberal example would be Sweden, a conservative one Germany. The corporate state in America is just in its infancy, and whether it will take liberal or conservative shape is yet to be settled.

One beginning for the corporate state in America was the 1933 National Industry Recovery Act. This was based on the U.S. Chamber of Commerce's proposal to end the depression through the efforts of a national council of businessmen which would work through trade associations to control production, raise prices, and stabilize wages. As put into effect by the Roosevelt administration, trade associations in each industry, usually dominated by their larger members, prepared codes of fair practices which stabilized prices and controlled production. Labor was fitted into the system by recognizing its right to organize, and by establishing minimum wages and maximum hours. The codes were enacted into law and were usually administered by trade association officials. By the end of 1934, this system evoked an outburst of protest from small businessmen; before the protests could be accommodated the Supreme Court declared the NIRA unconstitutional, bringing this attempt at instituting a corporate state to an end.

The corporate state was begun again during World War II, when hundreds of "dollar-a-year" businessmen staffed the fused system of business, military, and government power. After the War the system advanced further, aided by the continued need for government-business cooperation in the cold war, by the prosperity in which profits, investment, and corporate investment expanded, and by the practical political weakening of the labor, liberal, and left movements.

It should be emphasized that corporatism is not as singleminded or clear-purposed as the foregoing would make it seem. Indeed, the industrial community is often divided on questions such as the desirable extent of and limitations on foreign trade. For many industrialists, corporatism is subsumed within, and defended with full sincerity on the basis of, the free enterprise rhetoric. One illustration of this was one of the executives found guilty in the 1960 electrical equipment price-fixing conspiracy, who defended himself by saying: "No one attending the gatherings was so stupid he didn't know (the meetings at which prices were fixed) were in violation of the law. But it is the only way a business can be run. It is free enterprise." (5) These differences, however, only blur, but do not break, the dream of a unifying, rational industrial elite piloting the big corporations with government a full partner.

This dream was set forth in 1952 by the chairman of the Fortune editorial board. He suggested that corporations should replace the states as the units of government because of the managers more effective role in keeping all constituents satisfied. "Any President," he went on, "who wants to run a prosperous country depends on the corporation at least as much as -- probably more than -- the corporation depends on him. His dependence is not unlike that of King John on the landed barons of Runnymede, where Magna Carta was born." (6)
Freedom in the corporate system involves "participation" too, but only in the sense of belonging to an enterprise larger than oneself. For instance, the March 1964 issue of *Fortune* gives us this glimpse: "The kind of large-scale organization that the machine will encourage should encourage personal initiative. At the average worker's level the machine, because it continually reports back on a job, is already improving his sense of personal participation. 'Constant monitoring,' says William Morris, founder and president of Control Data Corp., 'makes employees feel part of the team effort, because their performance is judged without bias. We've found that people consequently upgrade their own performance.' " (7)

The politics of the United States so far are not adapted fully to this scientific industrial system. The enlightened Senators, Congressmen, judges, and executive personnel who compose the "presidential parties" are, for the most part, so adapted. Many Senators, however, as well as the bulk of the House of Representatives, speak for the tradition-oriented segments of U.S. industry, primarily small businessmen, who often are disturbed by the encroaching corporatism. They continue to believe, on the whole, in the "free enterprise" way. In this view, largely supported somewhat more in the House of Representatives today that in the Senate, the economic functions of government are limited to "the maintenance of law and order through the enforcement of the criminal law, the law of torts; the enforcement of contracts; the regulation of the health and safety of the population; the licensing of the professions; the conservation of natural resources; the provision of education and the relief of distress." (8) The Government's role is merely to enforce the "natural" rules of the competitive market.

3. The function and disfunction of backwardness

The fact that Congress is outmoded by corporatism was not a particularly destabilizing situation in the '40's and '50's. During that period, in fact, the blotted din of free enterprise anti-communist conservatism was functional to the large corporations in pillorying the left, weakening the labor movement, and entrenching cold war fears throughout local community life.

The two crises of unemployment and discrimination developed along with corporatism, however, and the pressures they create are the immediate cause of the now-mounting concern for modernization. It was predictable that the civil rights movement would emerge first in the region where industrial corporatism and the old market system are most in conflict. The destruction of Negro labor by mechanized farming and the racists' frustration of middle class Negro professional hopes were instrumental in causing the Southern Negro revolt. The replacement of men with machines in mass production industries and the several postwar slumps cause mounting unemployment in the absence of any major government attempts to deal with the problem. The entire national crisis of poverty is a byproduct of the imperfect evolution of corporatism in which the state has failed to function in its assigned role as provider for those who are not employed or employable in modern industry.

This is not to understate the various international problems that were becoming vexing so long as corporatism was crippled by its antique political apparatus. It is often difficult to bargain with the Russians when the Senate has the power to ratify treaties; it is difficult to link with the Common Market
corporate systems when Congressmen voice so many petty economic gripes. Kennedy, in fact, was forced to modify his position on the nuclear test ban and the 1962 trade agreement because of domestic political considerations.

But these world problems could be handled through executive action—e.g., the war in Vietnam, dealings in the GATT—more easily than domestic issues. For one thing, Congress never was structured to confront foreign problems. For another, it is quite difficult for an administration to conceal its domestic operations from wary Congressmen. Therefore, the present eruption of basic troubles within American society, for the first time since the '30s, means an irreversible conflict between the forces of modernization and the Congressional guardians of free enterprise.

4. Immediate trends

The grand drama is played out in specific events. The most apparent among these are reapportionment, the decline of the Dixiecrats, the modernizing of urban political machines, the rising pressures for "a new Congress," and the civil rights movement. All of these events so far contribute to the modernization process—some in the direction of the more liberal alternative and some the more conservative one.

a. Reapportionment. The Supreme Court's decisions in Baker vs. Carr and in succeeding reapportionment cases have led many to expect major changes in the composition of Congressional delegations through the elimination of over-represented rural districts. Although it is true that about half the rural districts are over-represented, it is also true that large central cities, on the whole, are not under-represented. This is true because they, like the rural areas, have been losing population. It is the suburbs that have been the primary losers in the past, and which can therefore expect to get the primary benefit from reapportionment.

How much difference would a reapportionment on the basis of population make in Congressional action? One way of getting at an answer to this question is to weight the votes of our present Congressmen by the population of their districts and see how this affects the outcome of past rollcalls. Andrew Hacker has done this for four significant votes of the 87th Congress: on the creation of a Department of Urban Affairs, on federal aid to education, on agricultural legislation, and on the enlargement of the Rules Committee. When the votes were weighted, in all four cases, the Kennedy administration would have received fewer votes for its position than it actually did. (9)

The obvious weakness in this attempt to gauge the effect of redistricting is that it is based on the existing Congressmen and their votes; presumably one result of reapportionment would be the election of new Congressmen from new districts who would vote differently from their predecessors. However, despite this weakness, this exercise should give pause to those who expect reapportionment to result in a major change in Congressional attitudes and activity.

No such major change, then, is to be expected even if reapportionment on the basis of population were to take place fully and rapidly. But not even this
is likely to happen. Rather, the change is likely to be a slow one, in which inequities in representation grow smaller, but are not fully removed. The changes will benefit primarily the suburban middle- and upper-class districts. The representatives of the newly-enfranchised areas are likely to be less in favor of the traditional political and economic thinking, and more in the direction of corporatist ideology, but still not in favor of democratic participation.

b. Decline of the Dixiecrats. Since the New Deal, the Dixiecrats have been a major force interfering with the establishment of a corporate consensus. Their segregationist views have no place in a rational corporate order. To a lesser extent, their economic views are also part of the old order. This is not because of any opposition on their part to government spending—the Dixiecrats always get their share of defense and space contracts—but, rather, because of the anti-federal rhetoric they use. Both these outlooks—racism and regionalism—are still influential on the national scene because of the committee powers which the South uses effectively in Congress.

Now, however, the Dixiecrats are voices of a way of life which is being sharply modified by racial progress and urbanization. Their numbers in the last decade have dropped by half; today perhaps 50-70 Southern Representatives and 15-18 Senators can be expected to vote regularly as a bloc. Not all Southerners are Dixiecrats; moreover, whereas border state representatives have frequently supported the Dixiecrats in the past, this is no longer true today. It is true that the Dixiecrats' power remains substantial due to their place in the committee structure and their alliance with conservative Republicans, but even there it is slipping; one of Senator Clark's speeches on the "Senate establishment" pointed out that the Southern Democrat-conservative Republican coalition lost its majority on five major Senate committees in the last five years. (10) The attrition rate is increasing because of age also; the expected retirement this session of Representative Carl Vinson, a Georgia Representative since 1914, is symbolic of the immediate future for an oligarchy that averages nearly 60 years in age. The 1966 elections, when a large number of the Old Guard face the electorate again, may begin the end of Dixiecrat power. Even now, the Southern Republicans are cutting rapidly into traditionally safe Democratic districts. Ten years ago very few Southern districts even had GOP candidates; today there are almost a dozen Republican Southerners in the House and effective GOP party organizations growing all over the South. It is difficult to determine whether the new Southern GOP will be "modern" or "traditional," but it is safe to say that the remaining seniority powers of the Old Guard Dixiecrats are irreversibly in decline.

c. Modernizing effect in urban politics. The days of immigration, and the colorful boss politics it produced, are long past. The traditional machines based on a weird amalgam of working class, small business, and professional political interests, are rapidly being attacked and modernized. Partly this is due to the dissatisfaction of suburban voters with the lack of "good government" downtown. Partly also it is due to the various reform Democratic movements, most prominent in New York and California, which are confronting the older politicians and institutions. The reform movements usually provide an opportunity for a wide debate on issues and sometimes they are the bases for populist or radically democratic candidacies. Their essential function, however, has been to express the urban middle-class liberal concerns for greater government-corporation spending on urban needs. They are not and never were opposition movements
against corporatism, although this is not to say they could not be crucial vehicles if such a movement were to spring up.

d. Immediate pressures for a new Congress. The rising criticism of Congress in responsible circles already was mentioned. There are semi-organized pressures as well. One of these, inside of Congress, is the work of Clifford Case, Joseph Clark, and others, to set in motion studies of Congressional operations, with the hope of eventual reform. Clark's recent subcommittee hearings, which presented the testimony of leading experts on the problems of automation, were an exemplary model of the modern Congress inside the backward one.

Outside the Congress there are signs that the liberal-labor community is aiming at the most vigorous political coalition since the Forties. Civil rights organizer Bayard Rustin, the Industrial Union Department of the AFL-CIO, and others are calling for an alliance of civil rights, labor and other liberal groups in 19 and beyond. The liberal version of modernization—a more rational, enlarged welfare capitalism—is receiving greater support now, perhaps, than any time in the last decade.

The new recruitment of conservative support for Congressional change may give indirectly more success to these proposals and pressures in the near future than they have had in the recent past. Modernization of Congress is thus becoming a key issue—but modernization in the direction of facilitating a corporate state.

e. Civil rights. The unavoidable challenge and motion of the Negro revolution introduces the strongest pressures for change in the American political system, as a serious attempt is made for the first time to accommodate Negro demands within this system.

If much of the future of the Negro movement is difficult to predict, at least its modernizing effects are visible:

Certainly the movement is speeding the Dixiecrat decline. Certainly it is pressuring Northern urban Congressmen to be more militant in favoring civil rights and welfare legislation. Certainly it is creating a liberal revival which is aimed at changing Congress. Certainly it is stimulating responsible corporate leaders to "do something" about eliminating arbitrary discrimination.

It also is important to see the countervailing possibilities within this creative disorder. First, the civil rights revolution brings with it the stirrin of counter-revolution among millions of small businessmen, low-salaried employees and workers who are not yet identified with the corporate style. The beginning of anti-integration picketing in the North is evidence of a more peaceful (so far but equally dangerous) counterpart to the white supremacist forces in the South. Here the Negro movement could be stalled in its search for political and moral support. Or, secondly, the movement could create such massive disturbance this summer that federal force, with the tacit or open support of the corporate elite, would be used to contain the Negro movement and freeze, under martial law, the inherently anti-Negro status quo. The long occupation of Cambridge, Maryland, by National Guardsmen is one example of what the future might hold; and the recent forced resignation of a steel corporation employee in Bethlehem, allegedly for participation in a moderate civil rights organization, suggests the negative attitudes which might emerge when the movement "goes too far." These trends could perpetuate traditional reactionary sentiment indefinitely. It would seem more likely, at this stage, however, for the movement to hasten modernization and be a major pressure for liberal policy. Whether it becomes some kind of radical movem
going beyond modern liberal reforms, is an open question, perhaps depending on the
degree to which the Negro forces—and other allies not yet so militant—are satis-
fied with the desegregation and other material improvements guaranteed under liber-
corporatism.

In summary, there are numerous trends, with liberal and/or conservative
support, immediately converging to force a choice between rapid modernization of
Congress and a rapid deterioration of stable social relations in the urban society.
Especially visible in the civil rights crisis is the possibility that the transition
to modernity will occur at the top while the convulsions of a dying backward
system are felt at the bottom. Should these convulsions be too severe the glad
hand of corporate managerialism might be replaced openly with enforced order. The
are more radical possibilities open, too, in the Negro movement—whether they are
realized is perhaps the most immediate problem for those seeking to go beyond the
 corporate state.

5. The elections in context

It is just possible that John F. Kennedy, were he alive, would have had the
historic role of carrying this debate between corporatism and the old order to the
public sphere. With some vacillation, he already was defending deficit spending
as an economic principle, civil rights and detente as socially needed. On the
day of his death he was scheduled to speak out, as he had before, against the right.
He was coming into conflict more and more with a Congress that would not
pass his modest programs of benefits for urban areas. Most critically, perhaps,
he was losing so much political support in the South that he was forced to the
urban industrial North for his political base even at the expense of foregoing
Southern support. For the first time since the days of FDR, the Democratic Presi-
dent personally was endorsing New Frontier candidates against the recalcitrant
Dixiecrats in a few congressional districts.

If the Republican candidate were Barry Goldwater, as seemed quite possible
before Kennedy’s assassination, John Kennedy might have scored a decisive triumph
against the market system. However, a much different situation appears in the
works with Lyndon Johnson in the White House.

Johnson’s position on these issues is less clear, if only because so far
it is less developed and tested in his Presidential role. His folksiness, his
southwestern upbringing, his deep ties to the Congressional conservatives, some
of his own philosophic statements tend to draw him as an Old Frontiersman of free
telepractice leanings. However, his role in national politics, his connections
with the big oilmen, his commitment to a “better deal” for all without disruption
for any, suggests that in practice he will appreciate and stand for the corporate
order. In his politics, however, his past suggests that he cannot adopt the
cosmopolitan and rational style of JFK, nor will he break with the tradition-bou n
forces if he can help it. That his function, conscious or not, is to garner the
support of all business, large or small, is demonstrated, first, in his rhetoric:
“I am so proud of our system of government,” said he in his March television in-
terview, “of our free enterprise, where our incentive system and our men who head
our big industries are willing to get up at daylight and get to bed at midnight
to offer employment and to create new jobs for people, where our men working
there will try to get decent wages but will sit across the table and not act like
cannibals, but will negotiate and reason things out together.... We have one thing
they [the Soviets] don’t have, and that is our system of private enterprise—
free enterprise, where the employer, hoping to make a little profit, the laborer
hoping to justify his wages, can get together and make a better mousetrap.”
Secondly, in addition to the merger of imagery, Johnson may produce a program which amalgamates the modern and the traditional interests. For instance, as the price for passage of his tax bill, LBJ made a nearly complete retreat from the advocacy (although not the practice) of deficit financing (a retreat that Kennedy was just beginning last November). The President now is insisting on frugality—including reductions in the White House electric bill—everywhere in the Federal bureaucracy, to mention just one sign of a return to the old-fashioned w

The rhetoric and program serve to bolster Johnson's ability so far to stitch back together the political coalition Kennedy had nearly undone. A Lou Harris poll published early this year revealed Johnson with 77 percent support in the Negro community and 64 percent in the whole South. The support from the Negro community is just under that given to Kennedy at the height of his 1963 advocacy of civil rights legislation, and slightly above the percentage of the vote JFK received from the Negroes in 1960. But the "real Johnson gain has been scored in the South, where he is a full 13 percentage points above the Kennedy showing of 1960, which was a bare 51 percent. This is also 17 points ahead of the late President's rating in the South just before his assassination."

Johnson is maneuvering—successfully so far—to undercut Republican support with his domestic platform, which appeals to traditional conservatives by cutting spending, and to liberals with a civil rights bill and a war on poverty. Therefore, barring an unmanageable situation on civil rights, and barring an explosion over Bobby Baker—two possibilities which really cannot be barred, but simply keep in mind as unmeasurable eventualities—the Republican campaign tactic is likely to be a crusade against the Democratic "sell-out" in the cold war. Perhaps the most likely nominee to carry out this attack is Richard Nixon, who is waiting in the wings for another try.

Three important points can be made about the election if it develops in this way. The first is that the corporate state will continue to advance as the particular dream of both presidential candidates and of higher statesmen in business and governmental circles, although it will never be clearly discussed by the two candidates who will blur it in folksy catch-all economic rhetoric. The second is that Nixon may stir up and expand what neo-fascism exists in American local society, which Johnson will find difficult to counteract. (Rockefeller's disqualification due to divorce is important proof of the wide gap between what lurks at the local and national reaches of society.) The third is that a further modernization of the political system will be held back because of Johnson's wish to keep his alliances with the old order. One consequence of this is that more than a dozen Senate liberals elected in 1958, many from normally Republican areas, are severely threatened with defeat in their first election tries; their position is weak to begin with, and they can expect to receive little ideological or other support from Johnson and the party establishment.

In short, the tensions related to civil rights and poverty will mount, but very little will be done even to modernize the political system this year. Even with modernization, we are suggesting, regimentation instead of democratic participation would be the main social style. But without any major steps to rationalize the political system, even the weak civil rights and anti-poverty programs, and the detente with Russia as well, will exist as absurdly insubstantial. The stalemate system, in which the ascendant corporatism is nagged by the irrationality of the lingering market, in which opulence breeds at the top and neglect proceeds at the bottom, in which anxiety and even terror grow within the new middle class is with us for the time being. Anything can happen.
Our purpose here has been to discuss the developing American political economy, not to analyze the existing possibilities for democratic social change. Nevertheless, certain ideas are implicit about social change in what has proceeded. Therefore we take them up explicitly in conclusion.

First, the important gains of the new corporate society should not be underestimated:

--The increasingly accepted idea that global thermonuclear war is irrational is more important to preserve than any other, for it holds the key to all possibilities of change. Today it is accepted by most corporate leaders, but not securely. There still is both the organized pressure of the far right and the lingering irrationality in many corporatists who still financially support the right wing.

--There is the rhetorical call to "end the cold war" accompanied by minor initiatives. This can relieve the world and our society of immense strains, most particularly the over-occupation with the Soviet-American conflict. But, more than that, it can open the very radical possibility, if only a bit, for American to hold their leaders responsible for the nearly total use of military and paramilitary, rather than democratic and social, policies in relation to the new nations. It is just possible that many Americans will not tolerate endless wars such as those in Korea and Vietnam, and perhaps an increasing number will open up enough to discuss why the US is unable to spend for the development of the new countries as the new countries desire. However slight the possibility of this, any advance is important (public opinion was a major factor in deterring an expanded war in Asia in the early 50's); any advance is radical because of the moral question to be asked of the society in this area; and no advance is possible without relief from the monotonous cold war fixation on the Soviet Union. From this perspective, the recent speeches by Senator Fulbright and Ambassador Stevenson are relatively hopeful signs of new and less lethal directions in foreign policy, however inadequate they are in dealing with the stalemate of political issues which must be settled eventually in the world. Even more heartening, because of the attention it draws to internal barriers to disarmament, is the development of a small "caucus" of Senators and Representatives genuinely interested in the economics of disarmament.

--The likely abolition of the legal forms of segregation would, first and foremost, abolish an indignity of terrible proportions, and should be supported with all speed. Moreover, it would release the orthodox class and interest group strains now somewhat concealed in the unity Negroes demonstrate against Jim Crow. With the death of Jim Crow, class politics might become more pronounced, with, for instance, the Urban League types supporting corporatist economic solutions and the SNCC types merging into a movement of the poor, perhaps against the policies of the corporate state. In the abolition of legal segregation, in short, there is both the possibility of greater dignity for Negroes, and of new democratic movement and conflict which could impede, if not stop, the drive toward a corporate society.

--There is, finally, the establishment of the principle that the economy is a humanly-managed one and not a blind market. While it is true that the management would most likely be done by an undemocratic elite, it is also true that the idea of democratic public control could be argued in a significantly improved climate. And the contradiction between democratic values and reality, once seen and felt by people, always is a powerful engine of change.

We say this not in jubilation but to point out in a calculating way what new opportunities might become available in the new society. However, it is importa
to realize that these possibilities and policies will not be achieved and maintained at all unless there is an active and relevant reform political movement. Whether it works through local political machinery or outside it, whether it operates in Washington or at the grass roots, all the socially-conscious liberal forces must be organized against war and the cold war and for economic development, civil rights, and greater democratic planning in a welfare state. Without this, the society either could close narrowly, or drift into final war.

Moreover, an active reform movement probably will not even be brought into existence unless there is an independent radical movement. Not that the purpose of a radical movement should be to spur liberalism, but that can be a secondary purpose (it should be recalled that the civil rights bill would not even be up for serious discussion were it not for the activity of the militants in the civil rights movement). What would be the initial issue of such a movement? It perhaps lies in the crisis of poverty. Class unemployment and economic insecurity may be too immediate and too massive to be smoothly managed by a society that still is diverted by the irrational debate between the center and the far right. Even now it is doubtful that many corporation leaders are enthused with even the Administration’s mild “war” on poverty.

If there is serious and proper organization, it is just possible that some day a movement of the American poor—triggered by the Negro revolt, bolstered by dissatisfied working people and the unemployed, supported by radical individuals and organizations from the worlds of established labor, religion and education—could put two quite unsettling questions before all Americans:

Why go on with a kind of economy, run by a minority, which buys prosperity at a devastating cost to more than one of every four Americans, not to mention the far greater deprivation that goes on daily in the rest of the world?

Why go on with a routine and money-centered existence when a movement for change could usher in a more creative and humane culture?

That will be the day.

Footnotes
2. Former House Speaker Sam Rayburn is frequently quoted as advising freshmen Congressmen, "If you want to get along, you’ve got to go along."
3. A classic expression of this point of view is Joseph Schumpeter’s Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950).
4. Congressional Record, February 20, 1963, p. 2525 (daily edition). This was one of a series of speeches by Clark, published later that year in a paperback edition by Hill and Wang under the title of The Senate Establishment.
9. This volume, recently republished in a paperback edition, contains an
excellent discussion of the differences between the classical free enterprise and the corporatist ideologies.