THE POWER OF THE DIXIECRATS

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STUDENTS FOR A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY

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The last major stand of the Dixiecrats may be occurring in the 1963 hearings on the Kennedy civil rights bill. Behind the wild accusations of communism in the civil rights movement and the trumpeted defense of property rights is a thinning legion of the Old Guard. How long will the Dixiecrat be such a shrill and decisive force on the American political scene? The answer requires a review of Southern history, ideology, the policy of the New Frontier, and the international and national pressures to do something about America's sore racial problem. The conclusion seems to be that the formal walls of segregation are being smashed, but the White Man's Burden can be carried in more subtle ways—as the people of the North well know.

Dixiecrats in history

For more than a generation the Democratic Party has been split deeply between its Southern and Northern wings, the former a safe bastion of racist conservatism and the latter a changing bloc of liberal reformers. The conflict is not new, and cannot be understood properly unless it is traced from the period of the New Deal.

In the 1936 election—the Democratic tide was rolling. Roosevelt brought to power 334 Democrats in the House against 89 Republicans. In the Senate 75 Democrats took seats against only 17 Republicans. The President's inaugural address promised the greatest liberal advances of this century: "I see one-third of a nation ill-housed, ill-clad, ill-nourished....It is not in despair that I paint you that picture. I paint it for you in hope—because the Nation, seeing and understanding the injustice in it, proposes to paint it out."

But Roosevelt, in trying to oust the Dixiecrat bloc from influence, could not escape the contradictions that eventually would paralyze his program. At the 1936 convention he was successful in eliminating a rule that two-thirds of the delegates must support a presidential nominee—a rule that had meant considerable power for the Southern delegations. Roosevelt's next target, an anti-New Deal Supreme Court, was less yielding. He demanded from Congress the power to appoint justices to the Court within six months after the seventieth birthday of each. The Congress realized angrily that Roosevelt's intent was not merely more efficiency, but to transform the Court into a legal outpost of the New Deal. Immediately the Southern Democrats and Northern Republicans, joined by a few Northern conservative Democrats, began a clamor of opposition. The plan of court re-organization was destroyed—and in the wake, a recalcitrant Congress gained the political initiative.

By the mid-term elections of 1938, Roosevelt and Congress were stalemated, and the nation remained in the clutch of depression. Roosevelt tried to arouse the nation once more in the election campaign, often directing his vehemence against the South, but many of his liberal allies suffered defeat in House and Senate campaigns.

The overt conflict between the New Deal Administration and the powerful Dixiecrat-Republican coalition was slackened by the advent of World War II when the nation's leadership "unified." But immediately after the war the fight resumed—and reached a peak at the 1948 Democratic Convention, when the Dixiecrats walked out of the party in opposition to its liberal civil rights proposals. Harry Truman's victory over Dewey, coming as it did without the support of either the left-wing Progressive movement or the right-wing State's Rights movement, seemed to signal the beginning of a more consistently liberal and viable Democratic Party. And so, as the 1949 session of Congress began, Administration liberals joined with liberal Republicans to limit the power of the House Rules Committee, a stronghold of remaining Dixiecrat-conservative influence. Under the liberal reform, the Rules Committee was given 21 days to report out a piece of legislation—or else the chairman of the appropriate House Committee could introduce the bill himself. Meant to subvert the tremendous power
of the Rules Committee over legislation and the procedures of the House, the new measure was used only eight times.

In 1951, after 29 Democrats, most liberal, were defeated in House contests, the "coalition of Republicans and Southern Democrats, backed by Republican Party leaders and aided by a silent Democratic speaker, restored the group's former privileges" (quoted from Holbert N. Carroll, The House of Representatives and Foreign Affairs, U. of Pittsburgh, 1958, p. 250. For the full debate and proceedings, see Congressional Record, Vol. 95, Oct. 10, 1949, pp. 15096-8.)

Republican strength grew for two years under Eisenhower, but by 1955 the Democrats were returned to congressional committee power. That power was undercut slightly, especially in the Senate, by the remarkable liberal victories in the 1958 elections. But for the most part in recent years, the conservative coalition has ruled Congress as it would a barony.

Dixiecrat Ideology

What are the ideas and programs characteristic of the Dixiecrat establishment?

Often the term "reactionary" has been used glibly by liberal critics to cover a lack of information about specific Dixiecrat behavior which itself is usually not monolithic. In the Thirties there was a minority of Southern "planners" inspired by the National Resources Planning Board, just as today Estes Kefauver had a far different view of economic development than most of his Southern brethren.

Keeping these crucial dissimilarities in mind, it still is fair to lump the Southerners together as conservatives—at least. On the level of political style the Dixiecrats have been known for a stifling demogouery that kept the better parts of the Southern white conscience silent and the Negro subordinate in every area of life. On the level of issues, the Dixiecrats generally split from the rest of the Democratic Party. Based on Congressional Quarterly (30 Nov. 1962) recordings of roll-call vote splits between the Dixiecrats and Northern Democrats in 1960 and 1962, the following issue differences are clear:

Civil rights—Fifteen splits were caused in the 1962 session of the 87th Congress, 12 in the Senate and three in the House; on a constitutional amendment to ban the poll tax, on a bill to restrict the misuse of literacy tests by registrars, and on Thurgood Marshall's nomination for a federal judgeship. In the 1960 session of the 86th Congress, the two wings of the party split on 27 Senate roll-calls and six House roll-calls related to civil rights.

Foreign aid—Nineteen splits, 13 in the Senate and six in the House, with the Southerners opposing or reducing foreign aid appropriations, and opposing the President's power to send aid to communist nations. In 1960 there were 15 party splits on foreign aid measures. Temporary unemployment compensation, extension to other workers—Opposed by a Southern Bloc when it came up in 1962. Depressed areas recovery program—Caused two Senate splits and 10 House splits in 1960.

Urban affairs—The conservative coalition successfully opposed the President's plan for a new executive department to be headed by Robert Weaver, the liberal Negro administrator of the Housing and Home Finance Agency. Medical care—The coalition prevented the bill from reaching the House floor and killed it in the Senate in 1962.

Taxes—Seven splits occurred in 1962, the Senate Dixiecrats supporting tax relief for Du Pont stockholders, opposing dividend withholding in the Administration's tax bill, and opposing amendments to close tax give-aways and loopholes.
In 1960 the House Dixiecrats voted for a "closed rule", a procedure which prevented Northern Democrats from introducing legislation to tax corporation, telephone and passenger transportation services, and temporarily increase the national debt. Minimum wage—South and North split eight times in 1960, the South successfully voting for a minimum extension of coverage and for a wage of $1.15 or lower against the North's proposed $1.25 and broader coverage. Federal aid to education—In 1962 House Dixiecrats killed the President's college aid bill, and Southern Senators voted to delete scholarships from its provisions. In 1960 there were seven splits in which the South opposed federal aid. Housing—In 1960 the Dixiecrats Senators opposed increased public housing authorizations, and Dixiecrat representatives opposed urban renewal and slum clearance grants.

These splits clarify the formal issues on which the Dixiecrats defect from the Democratic Party platform. But there is a spirit as well as a roll-call index that characterizes the Southern establishment. One must read an Eastland speech calling Chief Justice Warren pro-communist; or a Thurmond press release demanding preparation for a war of extinction; or study the hypocritical grabbing of federal funds while denouncing government spending; or merely know that these politicians are in power only because their constituents are poor, politically voiceless, and segregated—to understand the decadence holding sway in America's foremost democratic institution.

The Base of Power

How do Dixiecrats remain in power? The answer primarily is structural, involving the political shape of the South and of the Congress.

First, until very recently almost all Dixiecrats were elected from one-party, non-competitive districts with relatively low percentages of participating voters. In these circumstances a congressman is more confident of continuous reelection if he can keep his constituents happy or simply acquiescent. Towards Negroes the treatment traditionally has been more severe. They have been excluded from the political process except in instances such as East Texas where they are manipulated by competing white power elites.

Second, although the South is quite diverse, its political representatives historically shared an ideological consensus: the need to defend "the Southern way of life". This defense required unity and, at times, conspiracy against its enemies. Thus the Dixiecrats often operate as a high-consensus, interest-consensus caucus. Their views, except on the matter of overt bigotry, converge with those of northern (usually rural) Republicans to form the bipartisan coalition.

Third, the Congressional system works to the advantage of men with tenure, and men with tenure can make sure the system is perpetuated. The key is the principle of seniority, which permits Congressmen, by virtue of their years in office, to be elevated to increasing heights in the committee structure. "No major Western democracy rewards its politicians with so much power for so little relevant accomplishment," writes James McGregor Burns (Deadlock of Democracy, Prentice-Hall, 1963, p. 214). At present, Southerns chair a majority of committees in both Houses of Congress, although they "represent" only two percent of the national population. While seniority is the crucial principle, it is natural that the rest of the congressional rules structure benefits the Southern minority.

Rule 22, the "filibuster rule", makes it impossible to end debate on an issue unless two-thirds of the Senate concurs. Since Rule 22 was first adopted in 1917, there have been 27 attempts in the Senate to end filibusters (and the 28th probably is coming soon). Eleven of these attempts focussed on civil rights
legislation and everyone failed to cut off Southern oratory. In addition to specific rules, however, the entire tradition of "senatorial courtesy" inhibits any polarization and conflict aimed at radically changing the policies and structure of Congress.

The forces which historically have held the Dixiecrats in power run deeper than these immediate support mechanisms, of course. They include the usefulness of an easily-exploited Dixieland to Northern and Southern businessmen; the structured ease with which the nation has existed without confronting its problems of racial discrimination, and so on. But seniority, rules systems, and the traditions of "the club" are the immediate pins that secure the Southern bloc.

**Kennedy and the South**

What has been the relation of the New Frontier to the Southern bloc since 1960? The history shows a steady shift from uneasy fraternity to uncontrollable polarization.

It is not oversimplifying matters too much to claim that Kennedy's 1960 election was the direct result of a sympathetic phone call to Coretta King, whose famous husband Martin was impounded in an Atlanta jail just prior to voting day. Certainly the Kennedy political machine capitalized on the event: 800,000 leaflets describing the phone call were distributed at Negro churches in Chicago two days before the election (Kennedy carried Illinois by a popular total of only 9,000 votes—and received 63.7 per cent of the heavily-Negro Chicago vote).

Richard Nixon, meanwhile, issued a "no comment" on the King incident, intensifying the conservative image he had created earlier when he repudiated Henry Cabot Lodge's "Negro in the cabinet" proposal. For this and other reasons, Kennedy scored huge majorities in the Negro areas of the North: 64% of the city vote in Baltimore, 75% in Boston, 64 in Chicago, 71 in Cleveland, 66 in Detroit, 54 in Los Angeles, 63 in New York, 68 in Philadelphia, 67 in Pittsburgh. Both Republican leader Thurston Morton and Robert Kennedy attributed Nixon's narrow defeat to a failure to hold the Negro voting percentages which Eisenhower secured in 1956 (Ike was supported by 36 per cent, Nixon by less than 25 percent).

Though enormously dependent on the Northern Negro vote, Kennedy was ensnared in even deeper political debts to Dixiecrats and their allies. In his book Kennedy in Power (Ballantine, 1962), Prof. James T. Crown reports that in 1960 agreements were made with Southerners that no civil rights legislation would be backed by Kennedy in the first session of Congress and, further, promises were made of military contracts, increases in the cotton support level, and a $100 million loan fund for the South, attached to another bill. Kennedy, who breakfasted cordially with Alabama Governor John Patterson during the campaign, later appointed an old Patterson aide and prominent segregationist to the Export-Import Bank (which transacts business with "underdeveloped" non-white nations). That many other deals probably were struck is suggested by an editorial which appeared in the Birmingham Alabama Journal during the September 1962 Ole Miss crisis: the newspaper attacked the President for violating "pledges previously made to secure the Democratic nomination in 1960."

Thanks to the South's traditional pro-Democratic instincts, disclosed and undisclosed bargains, and the active work of Lyndon Johnson and Robert Kennedy, the President carried seven of the traditional ten Southern states—but only five of them solidly. Excluding the Texas vote which Johnson personally captured, Kennedy's electoral advantage in the South was 70-43, with 14 Mississippi and six Alabama electors defecting from the New Frontier to vote as independents.
Kennedy reversed Ike's 1956 success in the South, when the GOP had swept to a 77-50 advantage in the same states. But it should be noted that JFK's surplus 27 votes from the South were still a "cushion" and not a decisive edge. The President finished 81 votes ahead of Nixon and 31 votes over the necessary 269 needed for an electoral college victory. However, the GOP addition of 22 seats in the House crippled the President's legislative chances and, presumably, made him disinclined to alienate those Southern Democrats with whom he disagreed.

The first key to understanding the Kennedy relation to the South, then, is the concept of political balance. The President was elected not just by disparate groups, but by sharply opposed ones, with Kennedy acting as the diplomat-manager of the coalition. In the first year, he sent liberal Mennon Williams to Africa but conservative Charles Merriweather to Export-Import Bank; he strolled with Martin Luther King through the White House but breakfasted with racists as well; he nominated Thurgood Marshall for a federal judgeship but sent four or more segregationists to the Southern bench.

The President is fully aware that the Dixiecrats constitute a political impediment to the success of the 1960 Democratic platform. "Some Democrats," he said at a 1962 news conference, "have voted with the Republicans for 24 years, really since 1938, and that makes it very difficult to secure the enactment of any controversial legislation. You can water bills down and get them by, or you can have bills which have no particular controversy to them and get them by."

Their power is not simply political. It is also economic—the Southern Democrats are enabled by their position to demand privileges that other regions cannot. More specifically, the Administration has seemed reluctant to tread on the interests of Commerce Secretary Luther Hodges, the only Southerner in the Cabinet. Hodges is a former governor of North Carolina and executive of the Southern Textile Manufacturer's Association, the South's most crucial—and most segregated—industry, with 800,000 operatives. Hodges' record indicates little sympathy for the development of racially-integrated labor unions in the South even though they are the only conceivable means by which the Negro will obtain the economic security he desperately needs. At least for the present, Kennedy's establishment rests partially on the support of those who hold the Negro in the lowest sectors of the economy.

Two further factors are operative in the Kennedy program, however, which crucially affect his approach to the South and civil rights. One is the Cold War, which demands that in appearance at least we brush off our racism. Secretary of State Rusk calls racial discrimination the "biggest single burden that we carry on our backs in the foreign relations of the 1960's." While Cold War diplomacy dictates improved race relations on the one hand, it requires also the playing down of incidents which receive front-page attention in the African press. For the Kennedys these colliding requirements have led, externally, to displays of "vigor" with spare content and, internally, to a steady pressure on the civil rights movement to achieve its gains through the courts and negotiation.

The other factor is the evasive one of mood and style. The New Frontiersmen are young, urbane, filled with a sense of internationalism that opposes racial bigotry. But while acknowledging much of the modern world, they do not dream of a seriously better life or act on the basis of human values. "Unlike many of the New Dealers of 30 years ago, they have no illusions about remaking America. Crusades are not their style; fanaticism is foreign to them. They are men of power who enjoy high offices because they like to run things...their approach to politics is manipulative and managerial," writes William Shannon (American Scholar, Fall 1961, p. 486). This mood leads to bartering with entrenched Dixiecrats and
to discomfort with the spontaneity and revolutionary mood of many Negro demonstraters.

In this context, the Kennedy administration has done much more in the field of civil rights than any other government—and yet one can argue that the American race problem has grown worse in the 50's, especially in the North, in housing, schooling, and jobs. At a time when the cumulative effects of centuries of racism are running against the "status" of America in a new world, it is doubtful that irregular and partial measures can root out the sore. Kennedy's relations with Congress, up to this summer's unavoidable crisis, show clearly the dismal lines of "progress."

Kennedy and Congress

In the first days of the 1961 session, there was a major liberal effort to amend Rule 22 to permit closure by majority, or even by three-fifths of the senators present and voting. Despite a platform pledge to "safeguard majority rule", the President refused to side with the liberals—and the measure was buried in committee on a motion by Majority Leader Mansfield, the vote being only 50-46. "Mansfield did not bring up the issue again until the September adjournment rush was on. The Liberals' defeat came in slam-bang order," according to Congressional Quarterly (January 4, 1963, p. 12).

The President also passed up the opportunity to support Senator Joseph Clark's move to unseat any Democratic Committee chairman who disagreed with the platform plank related to his committee's area of legislation, which would have robbed the Dixiecrats of their essential power.

Finally, Kennedy approved the modest course of expanding the House Rules Committee from 12 to 15 members—a move that barely succeeded and which has meant very little subsequently because of the extreme conservatism of the House. The enlarged Rules Committee in 1962 released tax and trade bills, but killed measures in civil rights, urban affairs, youth employment, mass transportation, and college aid.

In May, Senator Clark and Representative Emanuel Celler introduced a civil rights "package" especially aimed at discrimination in voting and education. Although the President had designated the two Democrats to prepare the legislation, new Press Secretary Pierre Salinger commented: "The President has made it clear that he does not think it necessary at this time to enact civil rights legislation."

The President was vacuous in his 1962 message to Congress. "The President linked the approaching centennial of the Emancipation Proclamation with a plea for fuller guarantees of racial equality, then made it plain he had nothing original to put forward in this regard,"—editorialized the New York Times.

In April, two voting bills, with Administration endorsement, reached Congress. One recommended action to prevent the discriminatory use of literacy tests, and to make sixth-grade education (or its equivalent) the only requisite for registration. The other called for elimination of the poll tax requirements in the five states where they still are used.

It is a stunning comment on America that its Senate voted against the bill to prevent the racial use of literacy tests. It was filibustered to death, with Administration lobbyists expressing no essential interest. Anthony Lewis wrote in the Times, "President Kennedy may have wanted the literacy bill as an abstract
matter. But he said little on its behalf and did not act to make it a major public concern." The anti-poll tax bill did pass, however, with most Dixiecrats opposing it. But its significance is small, since it will take nearly five years in ratification and only affect a few areas at that time.

After two years of waiting for New Frontier action, New York Post reporter Milton Viorst wrote, "Southerners, especially those in the House, voted against most key Administration programs anyway—despite appeasement on civil rights." For example, as Spelman College Professor Howard Zinn pointed out, Georgia Senators Russell and Talmadge both voted with the New Frontier on only two of 12 key issues in 1961, and these two votes were on a non-controversial farm proposal. So it went with other Southern delegations.

In January 1963, Senate liberals again organized unsuccessfully to fight the Southern filibuster. They began a filibuster of their own early in the session, demanding a ruling from Vice President Johnson that the new Senate operates under general parliamentary rules until specific rules are adopted—which would permit a majority, instead of two-thirds, to eliminate Rule 22. Johnson, presumably representing Kennedy, ruled against the liberals, arguing that the Senate is a "continuing body" operating under its past rules. The Administration did succeed, however, in obtaining permanence for the enlargement of the Rules Committee. The price of this ambiguous achievement, however, was silence by liberals on all other congressional reforms.

Then, shortly after, the President presented his first major civil rights message, calling for several reforms which would improve the effectiveness of voter registration efforts in the South, and which would aid school districts trying to desegregate in areas hostile to integration. Although very moderate, as shown by the stronger legislation demanded by the Republican liberal leadership two weeks later, these were important proposals in the history of the New Frontier.

Reforming the Dixiecrats?

During the entire period, the New Frontier was advancing a cautious but substantial program of reforming the Dixiecrat contingent. Through foundation contacts and Justice Department initiative, it was supporting—usually with equivocation—the voter registration and direct action drives of civil rights organizations. It was prudently edging the Executive establishment out of its more glaring attachments to bigotry—hiring practices were changed, some federally subsidized housing was covered by nondiscrimination agreements, etc. It was seeking to persuade "reconstructible" Southern officials of the need for new attitudes, and everywhere it was building contacts with and strengthening pro-Kennedy Democratic organizations in Southern states. This spring the Administration broke custom by openly trying to purge 13 Dixiecrat representatives by financing their "moderate" opponents, an action not tried since Roosevelt's miserable failure in 1938.

For a while it appeared that the Kennedys could set their own pace, one which would be tantalizing and infuriating to integrationist and Dixiecrat alike. But their ability to do so was threatened increasingly by the civil rights movement. The government was forced, unwillingly, into situations embarrassing to itself in numerous Deep South areas. It still only took negligible action, however, even when Negroes were beaten, jailed, and sometimes killed for their efforts. But, imperceptibly at first and later with unavoidable power, the civil rights movement began producing crises which required more controversial Administration responses. The first important one, perhaps, was the entry of James Meredith into the University of Mississippi, which forced JFK into sending troops. More important, though,
were the series of revolts building up to the Birmingham crisis of April and May and followed by exploding Negro direct action in the North. History will record if these events finally burned the bridge between the liberal and conservative factions of the Democratic Party. The President was coerced into a "crash" program of mobilizing community support for voluntary desegregation, and he sent to Congress the biggest civil rights proposal to date.

A New Era

Although inadequate in the judgment of the civil rights movement, it did contain sections which would bar discrimination in most public accommodations; further, legalize the role of the Attorney General in litigation against school segregation, and place federal voter referees in certain Black Belt counties. While calling for restraint by Negroes, however, the President did not publicly demand a change in Dixiecrat behavior. There began instead a typical flurry of private political dealing. This time, however, the Kennedy role as broker was threatened by the steady evaporation of a basis for bargaining between liberals and Southerners in the Democratic Party. Liberals, especially those with Negro constituencies, are currently pressing for more comprehensive legislation, while the Administration wants a modern bill in order to obtain Republican support for a measure the Dixiecrats violently oppose.

It now appears that the Dixiecrats have prevented the passage of a bill this session, but the consequence is the greatest tension in party politics since 1948. Inaction on civil rights will increase the militance of the Negro movement, which will, in turn, create so much disturbance that the need for federal remedial action will become all the greater. It will also increase the discontent of Dixiecrats and liberal Democrats, not only with each other, but with the Kennedy establishment.

How long can this stalemate persist? The present tension may be a symptom of the weakening, and perhaps the decline, of the Southern oligarchy. America is obviously passing into a new era of social conflict. One of the enemies, and hopefully a victim, of this transition is the Dixiecrat; for he cannot answer the question posed by a civil rights leader at the March on Washington: "Where is our Party?"

NOTES:

1. "An earlier study of 56 roll-call controversies between 1949-56 corroborates these findings and testifies to the longevity of Dixiecrat influence...both Southern Democrats and non-Southern Democrats are split within their own ranks, but two out of three Southerners support the "conservative-isolationist" view on labor-management policy, displaced persons, taxation and revenue policy, use of treaty power, public housing, rent control, and some other economic issues, while two out of three non-Southern Democrats will support the "liberal-internationalist"! concludes H.D. Price, in "Scale Analysis of Senate Voting Patterns, 1949-56" (Harvard, unpublished PhD thesis, 1958). Price, however, underestimates actual Dixiecrat strength by not going on to point out that the two conservative Dixiecrats in every three are usually the highest in seniority and committee placement.

2. Of the 16 Senators with the highest seniority, 14 are Southerners; in the House, 66 of the top 125 are Southerns.

3. Southerners chair 11 of the 21 Senate committees and 11 of the 13 House committees.
The pressures weakening the Old Guard are these: first, the voter registration and general political insurgency of Southern Negroes cannot be tranquilized. It can only spread to Northern Negro communities and spill over to create a massive social demand for full employment, housing, and school improvements.

Second, the Negro revolt takes place in the midst of a broad shift away from rural-conservative power to urban-liberal political strength which the Supreme Court's stand on re-apportionment (Baker vs. Carr) is accelerating. The 1958 elections were an early and significant sign of this trend. In that year 15 liberal Democrats and three liberal Republicans were elected to the Senate, and since 1957, the Republican bloc in the Senate has been reduced from 45 to 33. In itself this trend has shifted the balance-of-power from conservatives to the moderates in the Senate. Senator Clark recently charted the path of conservative decline in a brilliant speech to the Senate. Speaking against the remaining conservative "Senate establishment," Clark pointed out that since 1958 the establishment has lost control of the Banking and Currency Committee, the Commerce Committee, the Committee on Government Operations, the Interior Committee, and as of Monday, believe it or not, the Judiciary Committee. They never had control of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare. They have lost control of the Public Works Committee.

Therefore time is on our side. Unless catastrophe overtakes the liberals of both parties in the election of 1964, I predict that we are within striking distance of obtaining control of the committee system of the Senate for the liberal and forward-looking elements on both sides of the aisle. (Congressional Record, 20 February 1963, p.2530)

As Clark shows conclusively, the Dixiecrats still are over-represented on the crucial Appropriations, Armed Services, Finance, Foreign Relations and Steering Committees. But here a third of factors runs against the old guard:

Time and seniority are running down. As William Korns demonstrates (in the New Republic, 16 March 1963, p.6):

---the Senate majority now consists of 23 Southerners, 37 Westerners, 13 Midwesterners, and 13 Easterners. But 22 of the Southerners entered the Senate before 1958 while nine of the Westerners, nine of the Midwesterners, and ten of the Easterners entered since that time. Thus an attrition rate is working against the South:

---six incumbents died during the 87th Congress. Of the 17 incumbent Democrats now 65 years or over, ten are Southerners. Of the 36 now 55 or over, 19 are Southerners.

---in 1964, when Johnson is likely to win with ease, 19 non-Southerners and only 6 Southerners will be up for re-election. If the liberals do not suffer disastrous losses in 1964, then they can look forward to the greater seniority which they will receive in the 88th Congress and to the probable setbacks for the ten Southern Democrats who must run in the harder mid-term contests of 1966.

Korns concludes: "...despite the prospect of some net losses among non-Southern Democrats over the next two elections, the present age-tenure composition of the Senate majority points to an inevitable shift in the pattern of seniority, with non-Southerners rising to the ranks now occupied by Southerners."

The House is changing subtly as well. Congressional Quarterly's 1962 elections analysis showed that only 25 of 69 retiring congressmen supported the President. Of the 67 new members, 27 are expected to be supporters of the President. This is hardly soothing information for the liberal, but it does indicate that the dwindling GOP-Dixiecrat coalition will be pressed even harder to find enough allies on all issues--their hegemony is broken, if not their ability to obstruct.
While this toppling process goes on "above" in Congress, "below" in DixieLand many Democratic politicians are either reconstructing themselves or being forced into it by the Negro voter and incipient Republicanism. Young, ambitious Governor Hollins, in retiring from the South Carolina gubernatorial chair, received a standing ovation from his legislature this spring when he acknowledged that the 1954 school desegregation was the "fact of the land." Only two Southern governors supported Ross Barnett in his "quarantine" of Ole Miss. "We believe in law and order and in the principle that all laws apply equally to all citizens," declared Georgia's Governor Sanders at his 1963 inaugural. The trend towards a new political fashion is clear.

Hurrying things along significantly is the development of a Republican, urban-and-suburban political party in the South, created largely by the influx of business professionals and aging citizens from the North. Ten years ago the Republicans were completely missing from the Southern scene. In 1961 there were nine Republicans in the House. Today there are 14, and the party plans to run candidates in every district of the South next year. They inevitably will force the Democrats to heed the lower-classes and middle class "good citizens" in the urbanizing South more than the rural reactionaries. No more pungent question could be addressed President Johnson than that of I. Lee Potter, chairman of the GOP Southern political drive:

How popular will they (the Administration) be in the large urban centers of the North if they continue to accept segregationist votes? How popular will they be among Northern Negroes if they continue to imprison the Southern Negro in a one-party Democratic South?

Johnson is political, and wary of the threat which Potter outlines. It is probably no coincidence that Kennedy's political biographer, James MacGregor Burns, in his new book Deadlock of Democracy points the way to a realignment of the political parties in the near future. Dividing the liberal and conservative factions of both parties into what he calls "presidential" and "congressional," Burns forecasts that the presidential party that first gains control of its congressional party will dominate the politics of the center-left or center-right for decades to come. (p.339)

The current "presidential party", of course, intends to dominate. Kennedy, had he lived, might well have alienated the South as soon as November, setting the conditions for realignment. LB J, however may postpone that inevitable day because of his traditional Southern support. However, the trend is irresistible: the Dixiecrats are outmoded. The problem now is to hasten their decline, of course, but more importantly, to ask whether the party of Wagner and Daley and Johnson is "our party".

To summarize, a review of events indicates that the present Dixiecrat bluster and filibuster on Capital Hill—no matter how influential at the moment—may be the last stand for an idea, for a political style, and for a cadre of political men whose power makes a profound mark on American history. With the Southern Bourbons on the edge of eclipse it is now perhaps time to suggest, briefly, a new agenda of problems which might be confronting the nation before very long.

Prior to any liberal rejoicing over the fall of the South, it must be seen that in nearly every instance of change today, the formal institutions of Jim Crow are being replaced by the deceit of the white commercial class. Urbanization in the South may lead to the scrapping of Negroes and other poor people into the "inner cities." Industrialization and automation, especially in the capital-starved South, may push the Negroes and poor whites still further below the lowest rungs of the economic ladder. These are matters of the immediate future in the South, but not so in the North. If I am less than enthusiastic for the new epoch, it is because I
know well the North and its white snaring suburbs, its complicated barriers that never seem either up or down, its millions of insulated consciences. I see the South, in the next few years, becoming part of a nation that cares only for its images and its social peace—while millions and millions and millions live hideously deprived in the city ghettos, unable to muster quite enough political force to change their condition. In this situation, the Southern politician, shifting from Bourbon to bourbon, will become the same corrupted man of promise which the North has heard through history. The task of defeating the ultras is nearing a climax; but this may be less a reason for rejoicing than for a new wariness.